My flight was uneventful and I am safely in the US visiting family and friends! I hope to get a few more stories and conclusions posted on this blog in the next few weeks.
Shalom!
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Monday, July 26, 2010
So I lied
I said I wasn't going to tell stories till I got to the US. And then we lost power in our apartment (some fuse got blown; I have no idea). So now I'm in a friend's, and he's got internet. Thus, the blog updates. And the thank you note writing. It's lovely to get some things crossed off the to do list already.
Thank you!
End-of-program reflection for the Peace and Justice Studies program and the Greer Scholarship:
Dear Greer Family,
Thank you for your support of my trip to Israel in Summer 2010. The summer has been one of academic enlightenment, personal growth, and hope.
My first two and a half weeks in Israel were spent studying environmentalism in Israel. Reading Alon Tal’s Pollution in the Promised Land, we traveled throughout the country of Israel exploring the history of the geography and people’s interaction with their land. Within a few hours’ worth of driving, we traveled from the beaches of the Red Sea and snorkeling, to the sandy mountains of the Negev Desert, to the blossoming fruit trees of the Golan Heights.
Settling down in Jerusalem, I studied Israel’s politics and history at the Hebrew University. I learned a great deal about the Jewish creation of the state in its ideology and methodology. I heard from many Israelis and Palestinians regarding the current conflict. One of my classes took a tour of East Jerusalem (where many Arab non-citizens of Israel live) with Rabbis for Human Rights, hearing a strongly Zionist argument for caring for the Arabs in Israel. We heard from the Parents’ Circle, a bilateral group formed by bereaved families who have lost relatives in the conflict. I saw a Palestinian woman being held by an Israeli man as she cried, the two consoling each other as they told us their heartbreaking stories. We visited the Peres Peace House and heard the stories of hope they create through their programming: joint sports teams, online chatting between Palestinian and Israeli schoolchildren, joint theater troops, and economic partnerships. A roundtable at the Israel Democracy Institute (the first roundtable I’ve participated in where the table was actually round) provided us with a chance to talk with Israeli academics about the tensions between Israel’s democratic nature and security issues – administrative detention, the blockade on Gaza, and prisoner exchanges. We heard from a Zionist settler in the West Bank who made a legal argument for her right to live there. We heard from Palestinians living in East Jerusalem who struggle to form community centers and send their children to school. We visited the Technion, where Israel trains its brilliant engineers and teaches businesspeople how to create successful start-ups. And, of course, we saw the Old City, and learned how close the holy sites of three faiths are to each other – in many cases, literally on the same ground – and the tensions this can cause.
In the classroom, our course culminated with “mock elections” and “coalition simulation” for Israel’s government. My group researched and wrote a platform for Balad, a Palestinian party. Our party won seven seats in our mock Knesset (parliament), and so we joined in mock negotiations to form a part of the coalition government. Through this interactive experience, we learned just how rocky Israel’s government formation can be. And we did it after visiting the actual Knesset, where many of us heard members of our parties speaking on the floor.
My trip to Israel was incredibly powerful. I learned an amazing amount and I am continuing to process. Luckily, I will have more time to do so through my upcoming anthropology capstone course. I will be taking the course with Elizabeth Drexler, the director of the Peace and Justice Studies Program at Michigan State. Throughout the fall semester, I will research in more depth the various peace groups I came into contact with in Israel, exploring their methods and their contributions to the peace process. The summer has given me a great start to the project, as I’ve had the chance to put some faces with names of groups and pictures with places. And through my coursework, I have built a contextual framework that will be vital in my paper as I begin to delve deeper into the reality of prospects for peace in the Holy Land.
I thank you for your support of my summer. It was a wonderful experience, and I do not believe it is over yet!
Shalom, Salaam, Peace –
Rebecca L. Farnum
farnumre@msu.edu
Dear Greer Family,
Thank you for your support of my trip to Israel in Summer 2010. The summer has been one of academic enlightenment, personal growth, and hope.
My first two and a half weeks in Israel were spent studying environmentalism in Israel. Reading Alon Tal’s Pollution in the Promised Land, we traveled throughout the country of Israel exploring the history of the geography and people’s interaction with their land. Within a few hours’ worth of driving, we traveled from the beaches of the Red Sea and snorkeling, to the sandy mountains of the Negev Desert, to the blossoming fruit trees of the Golan Heights.
Settling down in Jerusalem, I studied Israel’s politics and history at the Hebrew University. I learned a great deal about the Jewish creation of the state in its ideology and methodology. I heard from many Israelis and Palestinians regarding the current conflict. One of my classes took a tour of East Jerusalem (where many Arab non-citizens of Israel live) with Rabbis for Human Rights, hearing a strongly Zionist argument for caring for the Arabs in Israel. We heard from the Parents’ Circle, a bilateral group formed by bereaved families who have lost relatives in the conflict. I saw a Palestinian woman being held by an Israeli man as she cried, the two consoling each other as they told us their heartbreaking stories. We visited the Peres Peace House and heard the stories of hope they create through their programming: joint sports teams, online chatting between Palestinian and Israeli schoolchildren, joint theater troops, and economic partnerships. A roundtable at the Israel Democracy Institute (the first roundtable I’ve participated in where the table was actually round) provided us with a chance to talk with Israeli academics about the tensions between Israel’s democratic nature and security issues – administrative detention, the blockade on Gaza, and prisoner exchanges. We heard from a Zionist settler in the West Bank who made a legal argument for her right to live there. We heard from Palestinians living in East Jerusalem who struggle to form community centers and send their children to school. We visited the Technion, where Israel trains its brilliant engineers and teaches businesspeople how to create successful start-ups. And, of course, we saw the Old City, and learned how close the holy sites of three faiths are to each other – in many cases, literally on the same ground – and the tensions this can cause.
In the classroom, our course culminated with “mock elections” and “coalition simulation” for Israel’s government. My group researched and wrote a platform for Balad, a Palestinian party. Our party won seven seats in our mock Knesset (parliament), and so we joined in mock negotiations to form a part of the coalition government. Through this interactive experience, we learned just how rocky Israel’s government formation can be. And we did it after visiting the actual Knesset, where many of us heard members of our parties speaking on the floor.
My trip to Israel was incredibly powerful. I learned an amazing amount and I am continuing to process. Luckily, I will have more time to do so through my upcoming anthropology capstone course. I will be taking the course with Elizabeth Drexler, the director of the Peace and Justice Studies Program at Michigan State. Throughout the fall semester, I will research in more depth the various peace groups I came into contact with in Israel, exploring their methods and their contributions to the peace process. The summer has given me a great start to the project, as I’ve had the chance to put some faces with names of groups and pictures with places. And through my coursework, I have built a contextual framework that will be vital in my paper as I begin to delve deeper into the reality of prospects for peace in the Holy Land.
I thank you for your support of my summer. It was a wonderful experience, and I do not believe it is over yet!
Shalom, Salaam, Peace –
Rebecca L. Farnum
farnumre@msu.edu
Multiculturalism or Assimilation?
“I am Israeli. I am from Russian culture. I love Israel. All of it is me and I want it to be together.” “The Yemenite culture is part of me.” “I’m black, I’m Ethiopian, I’m Jew, and I belong here.” With these words, The Ingathering, an episode of the Tkuma series, opens its tale of immigrant communities in Israel. An academic paper written six years later by the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Haifa opens with “Israel belongs to a large category of societies built by European settlers and immigrants during the modern era.” Immediately, the two texts reveal the different lenses through which they look at the same issue. The Tkuma series focuses on people and individual stories; Sammy Smooha’s “Jewish Ethnicity in Israel: Symbolic or Real?” looks at the overall society, analyzing the state as a Western nation.
Though the two texts look through different lenses, they look at many of the same things. Below, I will address two themes central to both analyses: the melting pot and multiculturalism. First, though, I will look at a topic remarkably different between the two texts: ethnic violence.
The Ingathering opens with a scene from the Ethiopian blood riots. By showing the riots first, the episode speaks to how large a role ethnic violence seems to play in Israel. Smooha, contrarily, does not even mention the blood riots as an issue. This may be the result of his article’s later date. Smooha states that “the incessant Israeli-Arab conflict creates strong solidarity between all Jews in Israel” (51). His article came out just after the Second Intifada, when Palestinian violence was prominent. The Tkuma, on the other hand, came out in the late 90s, following a hopeful period in the peace process. I do not think it’s a coincidence that ethnic violence has seemed to be more prevalent when Israel faced less immediate external threats.
Regarding ethnic differences in Israel as a whole, the texts showcase two very distinct ideas about how various cultures and ethnicities should be integrated in a society: the idea of a melting pot, which both texts assert was the predominant ideal in Israel’s beginnings years, and multiculturalism, described by both texts as entering the society’s ideals later in the nation’s history. The two texts differ on how fully multiculturalism has come to replace the melting pot.
Tkuma uses the term “melting pot” to refer to the idea that immigrants should shed their old identities, forgetting their Diaspora life, including previous home and family values. Ben-Gurion thought immigrants should suppress where they came from, instead coming into the “Israeli reality.” Smooha uses the term “assimilation” to imply much the same thing: “For a long time successful absorption, adjustment, and integration of immigrants has been associated with assimilation. The newcomers are expected to discard their cultural heritage and ties with their country of origin and to completely assimilate into their new society” (47).
Multiculturalism, contrarily, refers to the idea that people are able to hold onto their previous identities while becoming loyal to a new group. The Ingathering speaks very proudly about the “cultural revolution” in 1977, when the Labor party fell to the Likud and the Oriental singers, Mizrahi artists, and immigrants writers that had been ignored for decades became prominent. Multiculturalism had “prevailed” and there was no longer a single model for what is “Israeli.” Smooha is much more cautious about asserting that multiculturalism won the day; rather, he believes that “immigrant groups cling to ethnic subcultures in addition to acquiring Israeli core culture” (57) due to discrimination and discomfort in their new society. Rather than true multiculturalism, Smooha insists that Israel has come to include three coexisting melting pots: one for Ashkenazi, one for Mizrahi, and one for mixed Jews. This is critically different than Tkuma’s claim that Israel has become a multicultural society.
Both texts end with a value placed on multiculturalism as opposed to assimilation, though The Ingathering does so much more tentatively. The episode closes with a diverse group of people singing about the beauty of the rainbow. But it voices a fear of this rainbow as well: “I think that we’ve established a state but we haven’t yet established a people.” “The last election proved we’re going back to the twelve tribes.” Reiterating his belief that multiculturalism has not become as prominent as The Ingathering suggests, Smooha asserts that Israel is currently “a tricultural society without multiculturalist ethos” (49), but perhaps it will one day be able to expand “ethnic ‘multi-sub-culturalism’…to a mild form of ethnic multiculturalism” (73).
Though the two texts look through different lenses, they look at many of the same things. Below, I will address two themes central to both analyses: the melting pot and multiculturalism. First, though, I will look at a topic remarkably different between the two texts: ethnic violence.
The Ingathering opens with a scene from the Ethiopian blood riots. By showing the riots first, the episode speaks to how large a role ethnic violence seems to play in Israel. Smooha, contrarily, does not even mention the blood riots as an issue. This may be the result of his article’s later date. Smooha states that “the incessant Israeli-Arab conflict creates strong solidarity between all Jews in Israel” (51). His article came out just after the Second Intifada, when Palestinian violence was prominent. The Tkuma, on the other hand, came out in the late 90s, following a hopeful period in the peace process. I do not think it’s a coincidence that ethnic violence has seemed to be more prevalent when Israel faced less immediate external threats.
Regarding ethnic differences in Israel as a whole, the texts showcase two very distinct ideas about how various cultures and ethnicities should be integrated in a society: the idea of a melting pot, which both texts assert was the predominant ideal in Israel’s beginnings years, and multiculturalism, described by both texts as entering the society’s ideals later in the nation’s history. The two texts differ on how fully multiculturalism has come to replace the melting pot.
Tkuma uses the term “melting pot” to refer to the idea that immigrants should shed their old identities, forgetting their Diaspora life, including previous home and family values. Ben-Gurion thought immigrants should suppress where they came from, instead coming into the “Israeli reality.” Smooha uses the term “assimilation” to imply much the same thing: “For a long time successful absorption, adjustment, and integration of immigrants has been associated with assimilation. The newcomers are expected to discard their cultural heritage and ties with their country of origin and to completely assimilate into their new society” (47).
Multiculturalism, contrarily, refers to the idea that people are able to hold onto their previous identities while becoming loyal to a new group. The Ingathering speaks very proudly about the “cultural revolution” in 1977, when the Labor party fell to the Likud and the Oriental singers, Mizrahi artists, and immigrants writers that had been ignored for decades became prominent. Multiculturalism had “prevailed” and there was no longer a single model for what is “Israeli.” Smooha is much more cautious about asserting that multiculturalism won the day; rather, he believes that “immigrant groups cling to ethnic subcultures in addition to acquiring Israeli core culture” (57) due to discrimination and discomfort in their new society. Rather than true multiculturalism, Smooha insists that Israel has come to include three coexisting melting pots: one for Ashkenazi, one for Mizrahi, and one for mixed Jews. This is critically different than Tkuma’s claim that Israel has become a multicultural society.
Both texts end with a value placed on multiculturalism as opposed to assimilation, though The Ingathering does so much more tentatively. The episode closes with a diverse group of people singing about the beauty of the rainbow. But it voices a fear of this rainbow as well: “I think that we’ve established a state but we haven’t yet established a people.” “The last election proved we’re going back to the twelve tribes.” Reiterating his belief that multiculturalism has not become as prominent as The Ingathering suggests, Smooha asserts that Israel is currently “a tricultural society without multiculturalist ethos” (49), but perhaps it will one day be able to expand “ethnic ‘multi-sub-culturalism’…to a mild form of ethnic multiculturalism” (73).
Balad Party
(A note: this ideology belongs to the party I was researching, not me!)
The National Democratic Assembly
On June 17th, 1996, Azmi Bishara and Hashem Mahameed became members of the Fourteenth Knesset in the state of Israel representing a new political party formed by a group of young Arab Israeli intellectuals : the National Democratic Assembly (NDA). The NDA is also known as “Balad,” a name based on its acronym in Hebrew (“Brit Leumit Demokretit”).
Like the state of Israel, Balad has had a tumultuous time in the last fifteen years. It has formed partnerships and been a part of joint lists with a variety of political parties; it has faced changing electorate trends and support; it has had rocky relations with the rest of the government. In this paper, we will discuss the history, ideologies, and platform of the Balad political party in Israel. The first section of the discussion will explore the history of the party, including a summary of its creation, voting trends, and party leadership. We will then turn to a more in-depth examination of the party’s ideologies, including ideas about foreign policy, ethnic identity and pluralism, democracy, and the role of religion in the state. Finally, we will suggest what Balad’s campaign platform might look like if elections were to take place in 2010.
A Brief History of the Balad Party
Since its beginnings, Balad has had a fairly close partnership with several other predominately Arab parties. In its first election run (1996), the NDA ran on a joint list with the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE).1 Three years later, it joined the Arab Renewal Movement, though the partnership broke down less than a year into the term.2 In recent elections, the party has run on its own.
A simple analysis of a party’s strength in the Israeli government can be done by looking at the number of seats held by the party in the Knesset. Because Knesset seats are allocated on the basis of vote acquisition, the number of seats won by a party is indicative of the proportion of the population that voted for that particular party. In its first two Knesset runs (the fourteenth in 1996 and the fifteenth in 1999), Balad won two seats (though the 1999 run was a joint list that later broke up, so some say Balad had only one seat). In 2003, Balad’s electoral support increased. It won three seats in the Sixteenth Knesset and has remained at that strength since.3
But the simple glance at seat number may be deceitful, partially due to joint ticketing with other parties. The party describes its own strength on its website, primarily in terms of how widespread it is throughout the country: “In just a few years, the NDA became one of the most popular parties among the Palestinian citizens of Israel, establishing over 60 branches in Arab towns throughout the state. “ Defining strength through a different lens, we might look at what percentage of different electoral subgroups a party wins. For example, even though Balad won three seats in both 2003 and 2006, its popularity declined among Arab Israelis, dropping from 30.9% in 2003 to 28.4% of the Arab Israeli vote as split between the NDA, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, and the joint United Arab League-Arab Movement for Change list. In order to win that third seat in the Knesset, it had to negotiate vote reallocation with the DFPE.5 Moving from the 2003 to the 2006 elections also showed a drop for Balad in the Bedouin and Druze voting blocs.5 Examining these trends is important for the party in order to make policy adjustments that might increase the party’s power.
“It is not uncommon to hear people speaking of ‘the party or movement of this or that person’…Balad of Bishara. “ This statement reflects the importance of party leadership in Israel’s political system, especially among smaller parties who have only a few people actively working as the face of the party. Azmi Bishara was a former member of the Knesset under the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (suggesting the origins of the close relationship between the two parties), though he left the Communist party after the upheavals of 1989. Born in Nazareth in 1956, Bishara earned a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Humboldt University in Berlin. He headed the NDA in every election through the 2006 run for the Seventeenth Knesset, even vying for prime minister in 1999, becoming the first Arab Israeli to do so. During the time of his leadership, he underwent a trial after making some statements seemingly in support of the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation. These statements include a press release on the party’s official website declaring the Palestinian people “will never surrender “ and a keynote speech made at a conference with the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy on Septemer 3rd, 2002, during which he asserted it was “clear that this form of occupation cannot be ended without a resistance strategy. “ Today, Bishara is suspected of aided Hizbollah in the 2006 War with Lebanon; he is now living abroad and resigned from his position as MK.
Following Bishara’s dramatic exit from the Israeli government, another member of the Balad party made a remarkable entrance to the political stage and has continued to draw attention. Hanin Zoabi was born in 1969 and lived in Nazareth. Zoabi studied at Haifa University and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In many ways, Zoabi was an average candidate for a Balad MK. Placed in the third slot on NDA’s list, Zoabi had a good chance of being elected. So what made Zoabi’s win so remarkable? She was the first female to be elected to Parliament from an Arab party. The few Palestinian women who served as Knesset members previously came from leftist Zionist parties, particularly Meretz and Labor.
If her election created waves, though, her statements since have caused hurricanes. In early 2009, Zoabi asserted her support for Iran’s having nuclear weapons, desiring a Cold War-esque Mutually Assured Destruction phenomena in which Iran plays the “counter-power to Israel…something to balance [Israel’s] power. “ This spring, she literally caused waves as she sailed on the flotilla into Gaza. In a press conference following her release from police custody, she was unapologetic, asserting that “Israel is used to doing whatever it wants with the Palestinians. “ In July 2010, the Knesset voted 34 to 16 to withhold a diplomatic passport for Zoabi and deny her subsidized legal counsel. Some have expressed concern that this action puts into question Israel’s democratic nature; Zoabi expressed her frustration that the Knesset did not “protect me from racism which targeted me for my views.21”
It has not only been her own actions that have threatened Zoabi’s political career. Her service as an MK was precarious even before she was elected. Israel’s Central Elections Committee disqualified the NDA from running in the 2009 elections by a vote of twenty-six to three in early, on the grounds that the party “does not recognize Israel as the Jewish homeland. “ Just after a week later, the High Court overturned the decision, asserting the case was based on “flimsy evidence. “ Balad Chair Zahalka called the overturn “a blow to Lieberman and the fascist Right...Balad stands by its platform. The court’s decision is a victory to the Arab public and to anyone who seeks democracy...we call on everyone to back the notion of ‘a people’s state’ and a life of equality and no discrimination. “ With that statement by the current chairperson of the National Democratic Alliance, we will turn to examine the political ideology of the Balad party.
Core Political Ideologies of the National Democratic Assembly
One of the policy areas which Balad has been most involved with is the occupation of Palestine and the peace process. The most detailed piece of their party platforms is:
To support the full withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital, and the implementation of UN resolution 194 regarding the right of return to Palestinian refugees.
They are extremely explicit about their vision for a future Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with a divided Jerusalem as its capitol. Within Israel, they support giving a right of return to Palestinians so that they may re-settle in their historic homeland. The typical argument against the right of return, that it would corrode the Jewish character of the state, holds no importance to Balad. The idea of a non-strictly Jewish Israel will be explored later.
Continuing with foreign policy, Balad is in favor of improving relations with Israel’s neighbors in the Middle East. As an Arab Nationalist party, the National Democratic Assembly identifies with the larger Arab world. In 2006, a delegation of Balad members made an unapproved diplomatic trip to Syria where they met with President Basher Al-Assad. The NDA has made similar motions towards Lebanon, the aforementioned delegation also visiting Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and Speaker Nabih Berri. Even more controversially, the envoy included a stop at a Hezbollah stronghold. In regards to diplomatic tour, Mohammed Miari said:
Personal identification with the Lebanese people and the preservation of their standing as a people is more important than formalities of the law…Our journey to Lebanon was rooted in the foundation of the Balad party platform, part of which states that we, the Arabs of Israel are an inseparable piece of the Arab nation.
With regards to Iran, Haneen Zuabi has made some very controversial statements regarding their nuclear program. Israel has typically been strongly opposed to Iran developing its nuclear technology out of a justified fear that they will develop nuclear weapons and pose a security threat. Zuabi, however, has stated that a nuclear Iran would form a legitimate power counterweight to the already nuclear Israel. Although she has gone on to say that she is not actually in favor of a nuclear capable Iran, this stance is still well outside the Israeli mainstream.
Outside of Middle Eastern politics, Balad, keeping with its leftist roots, recognizes global economic and political disparity. A part of their platform is “To struggle for an alternative world system based on equality, social justice and a fair distribution of wealth between north and south.”
Moving on to domestic politics, Balad is most concerned with protecting the rights and interests of Arab-Israelis. According to them, Arab communities receive a mere third of the financial support that Jewish communities do. Due to the inequality, Balad MKs voted against every national budget that is put in front of them. One of Balad’s goals, therefore, is to bring the two groups to parity or at the least lessen the wide disparity. Another concern is the unrecognized villages. There exist dozens of Bedouin communities in the Negev desert that do not officially exist. They do not appear on maps and lack government support and infrastructure. It is a goal of the NDA to recognize the villages and allow them access to electricity, water, and other government services. Yet another issue they stress is opposing the confiscation of Arab property under the auspices of eminent domain.31
Balad seeks greater autonomy for Israel’s Arab community and wants Israel to recognize the Arabs an official national minority with the collective rights thereof, “in particular, the right to autonomy in those domains which distinguish the minority from the majority e.g. education, culture and media.”31 They seek to establish stronger Arab institutions and civil society, including radio and television stations, cultural centers, business associations, etc. They also aim to allow for more independence in the education system.31 The main complaint is that Israeli schools do too much to teach the Zionist narrative and not enough to teach them about their Arab identity. From their official platform:
Through the state education process, the Arab citizens of Israel are psychologically and culturally being distanced from their heritage and language…The aim of this policy is to destroy the national identity of the Palestinians in Israel, and to prevent them from evolving into a recognized national minority with full rights.
The National Democratic Assembly is opposed to the idea of the Jewish state on both ethnic and religious grounds. Regarding the issues of religion and state as a whole, Balad believes in the full separation between Church and State. They consider many of the trappings of the state to be religious in nature and therefore incompatible with their secular outlook. In the words of Azmi Bashara, Israel should not be Jewish but instead “a state of all its citizens.32” Not only does the Jewish state create complications for religious minorities, but also ethnic ones. According to Haneen Zuabi, the whole idea of the Jewish state is “inherently racist.” By defining the state as being specifically for a single ethno-religious group, she continues, those outside of that group have difficulty being loyal.
“Rejecting the ‘Jewish state’ concept will block the road for anyone who demands our loyalty to such a state. There is no logic in demanding that I be loyal to an idea to which I do not agree to begin with, especially since I am proposing an alternative and fighting for it...The language of democracy does not speak of loyalty. This is a language of fascism, just like Lieberman. The language of democracy speaks of rights, equality, and values.34”
Economically, Balad can be found on the left end of the spectrum and can be considered Democratic Socialist. As previously stated, the NDA is extremely concerned with equitable distribution of government funds and services with regards to the Arab minority. However, they are also tied to the ideals of socialism and equal distribution of wealth in a more universal sense. In a practical sense, they support the capital gains tax and lower income taxes for low wage earners. This has shown historically with previous ties, and shared constituency, with Hadash, a mostly Arab Communist party. They also often have to compete for votes with the left-of center Labor party.
Additionally, the National Democratic Assembly supports full equality of the sexes (and is explicitly stated in their seventh of the “Party Aims and Objectives”). As previously stated, the first female Arab in the Knesset is an MK from the party.
2010 Campaign Platform
As a relatively recent political party, the National Democratic Assembly has not had a dramatic shift in ideology (as older parties such as the Likud and the Labor parties may have had). Thus, the political ideologies detailed in the above section remain much the same on the Balad political platform for the elections of 2010. Here, we will present a few current issues critical for the National Democratic Assembly in the voice they might use in current elections.
The “loyalty for citizens” bill proposed by Yisrael Beiteinu “is anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic in its character, and represents a blow to the Basic Law of the state on the basis of racism,” as so eloquently stated by our own Zoabi . The proposed bill would give graduates of the Israeli Defense Force and National Service job preference over those who “did not contribute of their time to the state,36” in the words of racist Foreign Minister Lieberman. We recently participated in a rally to oppose this bill and will continue to fight it and legislation that, like it, seeks to turn “a policy of inequality into law. “ Opposing this law is critical to our objective to “promote economic, political, and cultural rights” within the land of Israel .
Equally oppressive and undemocratic is the “Hanin Zoabi” bill presented in the Knesset, which we will also vigorously oppose. This bill will allow for the dismissal of a Knesset member who “acts in support of an enemy nation,” “rejects the existence of Israel as a democratic Jewish state,” or “participates in incitement to racism. “ The NDA finds this language almost laughable. Firstly, those who have proposed the bill were inciting racism even as they condemned others for it. And secondly, Balad has never requested anything other than a democratic Jewish state. Until the state becomes truly democratic, it is difficult to stand in full support, especially as bills of this nature are brought specifically to target Palestinian members of the Knesset. Our founder, Azmi Bishara, has recently been charged with “assisting Hezbollah in the Lebanon War.39” He has already been exiled from Israel as a result. Now, this bill – as shown clearly by its title – seeks to oust another of our members from the Knesset. Zoabi’s presence on the flotilla into Gaza was in no way an action against the state of Israel, but rather an exercise of her democratic right to criticize her own state. This bill would allow for a mere two-thirds of the Knesset – just 80 people – to oust any Knesset member they choose. Balad is not naïve: If passed, this bill will be used to repeatedly dismiss Palestinian MKs and directly challenges the existence of Israel as “a democracy for all its citizens.38”
Israel’s so-called “democracy” will never be complete until all of its citizens enjoy it. The Israeli government must mirror and create the hoped-for equality. A Palestinian party has never been involved in a coalition government. We believe this is reflective of Israel’s true status and results in continued inequality. Thus, Balad calls for all Palestinian Israelis, Palestinians living in Israel, Muslim Israelis, Arab Israelis, Christian Israelis, and democracy-supporting Jewish Israelis to vote for the NDA. We are at least 20% of the population. With every vote, we will win 24 seats in the Knesset, forcing other parties to consider us in coalition.
As part of a Coalition and with twenty-four seats in the Knesset, Balad will be able to realize its goal of cultural, economic, and political autonomy for the Arab citizens of Israel. We must be in control of our education, culture, and media in order that we might thrive and flourish on our own terms. In the Eighteenth Knesset, we will work for the recognition of Palestinians as a “national minority who remained in their homeland after the establishment of Israel. “ Apart from these critical material issues, becoming a part of the majority government will prove to us that Israel is serious apart its commitment to equal treatment, easing our “feelings of alienation and rejection from Israeli life. “
Recognition of the Palestinians as a national minority is a separate and distinct issue from the longed-for two-state solution; nevertheless, the continued mistreatment of Palestinians in Israel sends a signal to the Palestinian Authority that Israel is not yet prepared to allow the Palestinians the possibility of cultural autonomy. If there is any hope for peace, Israel must stop the creation of new settlements in the illegally-occupied Palestinian territories, its unjust policy of “land grabbing,” and admit to the Palestinian right of return. We are well aware that Israel believes Palestinians should have the right to return only to the land granted to the eventual state of Palestine and try to use this as a barrier to the creation of our state. Until the Jews give up on their “right of return” (as they claim the “right” to settle in territories that do not belong to them), though, it is racist to expect the Palestinians to do so. It is a great injustice to deny the Palestinian people, who have a very deep and historical connection to this land, the right to reclaim their legally-owned homes.
We would like to stress that the issues mentioned above are merely a few contemporary topics of concern for the National Democratic Assembly. But, as our name makes clear, we are most concerned with the existence of Israel as a democratic state. As so eloquently stated by Uriel Abulof's review of the Israeli Arab Future Vision Documents (texts which we urge every citizen of Israel to read thoroughly), an “ethnic democracy” is a democracy “of low quality. ” Regardless of whether or not a Palestinian state is formed, Israel must examine itself internally. We charge Israel to move towards a consociational democracy, in which all ethnicities and nationalities will be able to feel at ease with their state and engage fully in the political and social spheres.
No country in the world is entirely democratic yet or has achieved full equality. We believe that, with our help and guidance, Israel can be on its way to becoming close. Join us. Vote for democracy – for all. Vote for equality – for all. Vote for justice – for all. Vote for peace – for all. Vote for women. Vote for your children. Vote for yourself. Vote for Balad. After all, “Arabs aren’t the only alienated minority who would benefit from the strengthening of democracy in Israel. “
Works Cited
Abu Oksa Daoud, Suheir. “Palestinian Women in the Israeli Knesset.” Middle East Report, 240, 26-31. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Abulof, Uriel. “‘Back to the Future:’ A Comparative Ethical Look at Israeli Arab Future Vision Documents.” Israel Studies Forum 23(2), pp. 29-54.
Bishara, Azmi. “The Quest for Strategy.” Journal of Palestine Studies 32(2), pp 41-49. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Bishara, Azmi, Sara Scalenghe, Steve Rothman, and Joel Beinin. “On Palestinians in the Israeli Knesset: Interview with Azmi Bishara.” Middle East Report, 201, pp. 27-28, 30. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Gazzar, Brenda. “Balad candidate may be first Arab party woman MK.” The Jerusalem Post Online, 9 February 2009. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Glickman, Aviad. “Arab parties disqualified from elections.” ynetnews, 12 January 2009. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Glickman, Aviad. “Arab parties win disqualification appeal.” ynetnews, 21 January 2009. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Haaretz. “Balad: A country of all its citizens, cultural autonomy for Arabs.” 23 December 2002. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
“Israeli Election Source Kit.” Accessed 21 July 2010 at.
Jamal, Amal. “The Arab Leadership in Israel: Ascendance and Fragmentation.” Journal of Palestine Studies 35(2), pp. 6-22. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Jewish Virtual Library. “National Democratic Party (Balad).” The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise. 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Katz, Yaakov. “Gaza flotilla finally sets out.” The Jerusalem Post Online. 30 May 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Khoury, Jack and Yoav Stern. “Balad member, former MK Miari: ‘Syria is not an enemy country.’” Haaretz Online. 18 September 2006. Accessed 21 July 2010 at.
Knesset. “Azmi Bishara.” 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Knesset. “Hanin Zoabi.” 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Knesset. “National Democratic Assembly (Balad).” 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Lis, Jonathan. “Bill giving job preferences to IDF graduates faces appeal.” Haaretz Online. 12 July 2010. Accessed 18 July 2010 at.
Lis, Jonathan. “Knesset committee to discuss ‘Hanin Zuabi’ law.” Haaretz Online. 5 June 2010. Accessed 18 July 2010 at.
Mair, Lucy. “Off the Map: Land and Housing Rights Violations in Israel’s Unrecognized Bedouin Villages.” Human Rights Watch Online. 30 March 2008. Accessed 21 July 2010 at
NDA. “National Democratic Assembly – NDA.” 5 February 2009. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
NDA. “National Democratic Assembly PRESS RELEASE.” 24 September 2002. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Peretz, Don and Gideon Doron. “Sectarian Politics and the Peace Process: The 1999 Israel Elections.” Middle East Journal 54(2), 259-273. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Rekhess, Elie. “The Arab Minority in Israel and the Seventeenth Knesset Elections: The Beginning of a New Era?,” in Arian Asher and Michael Shamir, eds. The Elections in Israel 2006. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 2008.
Scheindlin, Dahlia. “Bring Arabs into the coalition.” Haaretz Online. 25 June 2010. Accessed online 18 July 2010 at.
Sokol, Samuel. “New Balad MK praises Iran’s nuke quest.” The Jerusalem Post Online. 31 March 2009. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Stoil, Rebecca Anna. “Knesset revokes Zoabi’s MK rights.” The Jerusalem Post Online. 13 July 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
Stoil, Rebecca Anna. “Zoabi: ‘Confrontation was not our goal.’“ The Jerusalem Post Online. 2 June 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at.
The National Democratic Assembly
On June 17th, 1996, Azmi Bishara and Hashem Mahameed became members of the Fourteenth Knesset in the state of Israel representing a new political party formed by a group of young Arab Israeli intellectuals : the National Democratic Assembly (NDA). The NDA is also known as “Balad,” a name based on its acronym in Hebrew (“Brit Leumit Demokretit”).
Like the state of Israel, Balad has had a tumultuous time in the last fifteen years. It has formed partnerships and been a part of joint lists with a variety of political parties; it has faced changing electorate trends and support; it has had rocky relations with the rest of the government. In this paper, we will discuss the history, ideologies, and platform of the Balad political party in Israel. The first section of the discussion will explore the history of the party, including a summary of its creation, voting trends, and party leadership. We will then turn to a more in-depth examination of the party’s ideologies, including ideas about foreign policy, ethnic identity and pluralism, democracy, and the role of religion in the state. Finally, we will suggest what Balad’s campaign platform might look like if elections were to take place in 2010.
A Brief History of the Balad Party
Since its beginnings, Balad has had a fairly close partnership with several other predominately Arab parties. In its first election run (1996), the NDA ran on a joint list with the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE).1 Three years later, it joined the Arab Renewal Movement, though the partnership broke down less than a year into the term.2 In recent elections, the party has run on its own.
A simple analysis of a party’s strength in the Israeli government can be done by looking at the number of seats held by the party in the Knesset. Because Knesset seats are allocated on the basis of vote acquisition, the number of seats won by a party is indicative of the proportion of the population that voted for that particular party. In its first two Knesset runs (the fourteenth in 1996 and the fifteenth in 1999), Balad won two seats (though the 1999 run was a joint list that later broke up, so some say Balad had only one seat). In 2003, Balad’s electoral support increased. It won three seats in the Sixteenth Knesset and has remained at that strength since.3
But the simple glance at seat number may be deceitful, partially due to joint ticketing with other parties. The party describes its own strength on its website, primarily in terms of how widespread it is throughout the country: “In just a few years, the NDA became one of the most popular parties among the Palestinian citizens of Israel, establishing over 60 branches in Arab towns throughout the state. “ Defining strength through a different lens, we might look at what percentage of different electoral subgroups a party wins. For example, even though Balad won three seats in both 2003 and 2006, its popularity declined among Arab Israelis, dropping from 30.9% in 2003 to 28.4% of the Arab Israeli vote as split between the NDA, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, and the joint United Arab League-Arab Movement for Change list. In order to win that third seat in the Knesset, it had to negotiate vote reallocation with the DFPE.5 Moving from the 2003 to the 2006 elections also showed a drop for Balad in the Bedouin and Druze voting blocs.5 Examining these trends is important for the party in order to make policy adjustments that might increase the party’s power.
“It is not uncommon to hear people speaking of ‘the party or movement of this or that person’…Balad of Bishara. “ This statement reflects the importance of party leadership in Israel’s political system, especially among smaller parties who have only a few people actively working as the face of the party. Azmi Bishara was a former member of the Knesset under the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (suggesting the origins of the close relationship between the two parties), though he left the Communist party after the upheavals of 1989. Born in Nazareth in 1956, Bishara earned a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Humboldt University in Berlin. He headed the NDA in every election through the 2006 run for the Seventeenth Knesset, even vying for prime minister in 1999, becoming the first Arab Israeli to do so. During the time of his leadership, he underwent a trial after making some statements seemingly in support of the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation. These statements include a press release on the party’s official website declaring the Palestinian people “will never surrender “ and a keynote speech made at a conference with the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy on Septemer 3rd, 2002, during which he asserted it was “clear that this form of occupation cannot be ended without a resistance strategy. “ Today, Bishara is suspected of aided Hizbollah in the 2006 War with Lebanon; he is now living abroad and resigned from his position as MK.
Following Bishara’s dramatic exit from the Israeli government, another member of the Balad party made a remarkable entrance to the political stage and has continued to draw attention. Hanin Zoabi was born in 1969 and lived in Nazareth. Zoabi studied at Haifa University and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In many ways, Zoabi was an average candidate for a Balad MK. Placed in the third slot on NDA’s list, Zoabi had a good chance of being elected. So what made Zoabi’s win so remarkable? She was the first female to be elected to Parliament from an Arab party. The few Palestinian women who served as Knesset members previously came from leftist Zionist parties, particularly Meretz and Labor.
If her election created waves, though, her statements since have caused hurricanes. In early 2009, Zoabi asserted her support for Iran’s having nuclear weapons, desiring a Cold War-esque Mutually Assured Destruction phenomena in which Iran plays the “counter-power to Israel…something to balance [Israel’s] power. “ This spring, she literally caused waves as she sailed on the flotilla into Gaza. In a press conference following her release from police custody, she was unapologetic, asserting that “Israel is used to doing whatever it wants with the Palestinians. “ In July 2010, the Knesset voted 34 to 16 to withhold a diplomatic passport for Zoabi and deny her subsidized legal counsel. Some have expressed concern that this action puts into question Israel’s democratic nature; Zoabi expressed her frustration that the Knesset did not “protect me from racism which targeted me for my views.21”
It has not only been her own actions that have threatened Zoabi’s political career. Her service as an MK was precarious even before she was elected. Israel’s Central Elections Committee disqualified the NDA from running in the 2009 elections by a vote of twenty-six to three in early, on the grounds that the party “does not recognize Israel as the Jewish homeland. “ Just after a week later, the High Court overturned the decision, asserting the case was based on “flimsy evidence. “ Balad Chair Zahalka called the overturn “a blow to Lieberman and the fascist Right...Balad stands by its platform. The court’s decision is a victory to the Arab public and to anyone who seeks democracy...we call on everyone to back the notion of ‘a people’s state’ and a life of equality and no discrimination. “ With that statement by the current chairperson of the National Democratic Alliance, we will turn to examine the political ideology of the Balad party.
Core Political Ideologies of the National Democratic Assembly
One of the policy areas which Balad has been most involved with is the occupation of Palestine and the peace process. The most detailed piece of their party platforms is:
To support the full withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital, and the implementation of UN resolution 194 regarding the right of return to Palestinian refugees.
They are extremely explicit about their vision for a future Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with a divided Jerusalem as its capitol. Within Israel, they support giving a right of return to Palestinians so that they may re-settle in their historic homeland. The typical argument against the right of return, that it would corrode the Jewish character of the state, holds no importance to Balad. The idea of a non-strictly Jewish Israel will be explored later.
Continuing with foreign policy, Balad is in favor of improving relations with Israel’s neighbors in the Middle East. As an Arab Nationalist party, the National Democratic Assembly identifies with the larger Arab world. In 2006, a delegation of Balad members made an unapproved diplomatic trip to Syria where they met with President Basher Al-Assad. The NDA has made similar motions towards Lebanon, the aforementioned delegation also visiting Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and Speaker Nabih Berri. Even more controversially, the envoy included a stop at a Hezbollah stronghold. In regards to diplomatic tour, Mohammed Miari said:
Personal identification with the Lebanese people and the preservation of their standing as a people is more important than formalities of the law…Our journey to Lebanon was rooted in the foundation of the Balad party platform, part of which states that we, the Arabs of Israel are an inseparable piece of the Arab nation.
With regards to Iran, Haneen Zuabi has made some very controversial statements regarding their nuclear program. Israel has typically been strongly opposed to Iran developing its nuclear technology out of a justified fear that they will develop nuclear weapons and pose a security threat. Zuabi, however, has stated that a nuclear Iran would form a legitimate power counterweight to the already nuclear Israel. Although she has gone on to say that she is not actually in favor of a nuclear capable Iran, this stance is still well outside the Israeli mainstream.
Outside of Middle Eastern politics, Balad, keeping with its leftist roots, recognizes global economic and political disparity. A part of their platform is “To struggle for an alternative world system based on equality, social justice and a fair distribution of wealth between north and south.”
Moving on to domestic politics, Balad is most concerned with protecting the rights and interests of Arab-Israelis. According to them, Arab communities receive a mere third of the financial support that Jewish communities do. Due to the inequality, Balad MKs voted against every national budget that is put in front of them. One of Balad’s goals, therefore, is to bring the two groups to parity or at the least lessen the wide disparity. Another concern is the unrecognized villages. There exist dozens of Bedouin communities in the Negev desert that do not officially exist. They do not appear on maps and lack government support and infrastructure. It is a goal of the NDA to recognize the villages and allow them access to electricity, water, and other government services. Yet another issue they stress is opposing the confiscation of Arab property under the auspices of eminent domain.31
Balad seeks greater autonomy for Israel’s Arab community and wants Israel to recognize the Arabs an official national minority with the collective rights thereof, “in particular, the right to autonomy in those domains which distinguish the minority from the majority e.g. education, culture and media.”31 They seek to establish stronger Arab institutions and civil society, including radio and television stations, cultural centers, business associations, etc. They also aim to allow for more independence in the education system.31 The main complaint is that Israeli schools do too much to teach the Zionist narrative and not enough to teach them about their Arab identity. From their official platform:
Through the state education process, the Arab citizens of Israel are psychologically and culturally being distanced from their heritage and language…The aim of this policy is to destroy the national identity of the Palestinians in Israel, and to prevent them from evolving into a recognized national minority with full rights.
The National Democratic Assembly is opposed to the idea of the Jewish state on both ethnic and religious grounds. Regarding the issues of religion and state as a whole, Balad believes in the full separation between Church and State. They consider many of the trappings of the state to be religious in nature and therefore incompatible with their secular outlook. In the words of Azmi Bashara, Israel should not be Jewish but instead “a state of all its citizens.32” Not only does the Jewish state create complications for religious minorities, but also ethnic ones. According to Haneen Zuabi, the whole idea of the Jewish state is “inherently racist.” By defining the state as being specifically for a single ethno-religious group, she continues, those outside of that group have difficulty being loyal.
“Rejecting the ‘Jewish state’ concept will block the road for anyone who demands our loyalty to such a state. There is no logic in demanding that I be loyal to an idea to which I do not agree to begin with, especially since I am proposing an alternative and fighting for it...The language of democracy does not speak of loyalty. This is a language of fascism, just like Lieberman. The language of democracy speaks of rights, equality, and values.34”
Economically, Balad can be found on the left end of the spectrum and can be considered Democratic Socialist. As previously stated, the NDA is extremely concerned with equitable distribution of government funds and services with regards to the Arab minority. However, they are also tied to the ideals of socialism and equal distribution of wealth in a more universal sense. In a practical sense, they support the capital gains tax and lower income taxes for low wage earners. This has shown historically with previous ties, and shared constituency, with Hadash, a mostly Arab Communist party. They also often have to compete for votes with the left-of center Labor party.
Additionally, the National Democratic Assembly supports full equality of the sexes (and is explicitly stated in their seventh of the “Party Aims and Objectives”). As previously stated, the first female Arab in the Knesset is an MK from the party.
2010 Campaign Platform
As a relatively recent political party, the National Democratic Assembly has not had a dramatic shift in ideology (as older parties such as the Likud and the Labor parties may have had). Thus, the political ideologies detailed in the above section remain much the same on the Balad political platform for the elections of 2010. Here, we will present a few current issues critical for the National Democratic Assembly in the voice they might use in current elections.
The “loyalty for citizens” bill proposed by Yisrael Beiteinu “is anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic in its character, and represents a blow to the Basic Law of the state on the basis of racism,” as so eloquently stated by our own Zoabi . The proposed bill would give graduates of the Israeli Defense Force and National Service job preference over those who “did not contribute of their time to the state,36” in the words of racist Foreign Minister Lieberman. We recently participated in a rally to oppose this bill and will continue to fight it and legislation that, like it, seeks to turn “a policy of inequality into law. “ Opposing this law is critical to our objective to “promote economic, political, and cultural rights” within the land of Israel .
Equally oppressive and undemocratic is the “Hanin Zoabi” bill presented in the Knesset, which we will also vigorously oppose. This bill will allow for the dismissal of a Knesset member who “acts in support of an enemy nation,” “rejects the existence of Israel as a democratic Jewish state,” or “participates in incitement to racism. “ The NDA finds this language almost laughable. Firstly, those who have proposed the bill were inciting racism even as they condemned others for it. And secondly, Balad has never requested anything other than a democratic Jewish state. Until the state becomes truly democratic, it is difficult to stand in full support, especially as bills of this nature are brought specifically to target Palestinian members of the Knesset. Our founder, Azmi Bishara, has recently been charged with “assisting Hezbollah in the Lebanon War.39” He has already been exiled from Israel as a result. Now, this bill – as shown clearly by its title – seeks to oust another of our members from the Knesset. Zoabi’s presence on the flotilla into Gaza was in no way an action against the state of Israel, but rather an exercise of her democratic right to criticize her own state. This bill would allow for a mere two-thirds of the Knesset – just 80 people – to oust any Knesset member they choose. Balad is not naïve: If passed, this bill will be used to repeatedly dismiss Palestinian MKs and directly challenges the existence of Israel as “a democracy for all its citizens.38”
Israel’s so-called “democracy” will never be complete until all of its citizens enjoy it. The Israeli government must mirror and create the hoped-for equality. A Palestinian party has never been involved in a coalition government. We believe this is reflective of Israel’s true status and results in continued inequality. Thus, Balad calls for all Palestinian Israelis, Palestinians living in Israel, Muslim Israelis, Arab Israelis, Christian Israelis, and democracy-supporting Jewish Israelis to vote for the NDA. We are at least 20% of the population. With every vote, we will win 24 seats in the Knesset, forcing other parties to consider us in coalition.
As part of a Coalition and with twenty-four seats in the Knesset, Balad will be able to realize its goal of cultural, economic, and political autonomy for the Arab citizens of Israel. We must be in control of our education, culture, and media in order that we might thrive and flourish on our own terms. In the Eighteenth Knesset, we will work for the recognition of Palestinians as a “national minority who remained in their homeland after the establishment of Israel. “ Apart from these critical material issues, becoming a part of the majority government will prove to us that Israel is serious apart its commitment to equal treatment, easing our “feelings of alienation and rejection from Israeli life. “
Recognition of the Palestinians as a national minority is a separate and distinct issue from the longed-for two-state solution; nevertheless, the continued mistreatment of Palestinians in Israel sends a signal to the Palestinian Authority that Israel is not yet prepared to allow the Palestinians the possibility of cultural autonomy. If there is any hope for peace, Israel must stop the creation of new settlements in the illegally-occupied Palestinian territories, its unjust policy of “land grabbing,” and admit to the Palestinian right of return. We are well aware that Israel believes Palestinians should have the right to return only to the land granted to the eventual state of Palestine and try to use this as a barrier to the creation of our state. Until the Jews give up on their “right of return” (as they claim the “right” to settle in territories that do not belong to them), though, it is racist to expect the Palestinians to do so. It is a great injustice to deny the Palestinian people, who have a very deep and historical connection to this land, the right to reclaim their legally-owned homes.
We would like to stress that the issues mentioned above are merely a few contemporary topics of concern for the National Democratic Assembly. But, as our name makes clear, we are most concerned with the existence of Israel as a democratic state. As so eloquently stated by Uriel Abulof's review of the Israeli Arab Future Vision Documents (texts which we urge every citizen of Israel to read thoroughly), an “ethnic democracy” is a democracy “of low quality. ” Regardless of whether or not a Palestinian state is formed, Israel must examine itself internally. We charge Israel to move towards a consociational democracy, in which all ethnicities and nationalities will be able to feel at ease with their state and engage fully in the political and social spheres.
No country in the world is entirely democratic yet or has achieved full equality. We believe that, with our help and guidance, Israel can be on its way to becoming close. Join us. Vote for democracy – for all. Vote for equality – for all. Vote for justice – for all. Vote for peace – for all. Vote for women. Vote for your children. Vote for yourself. Vote for Balad. After all, “Arabs aren’t the only alienated minority who would benefit from the strengthening of democracy in Israel. “
Works Cited
Abu Oksa Daoud, Suheir. “Palestinian Women in the Israeli Knesset.” Middle East Report, 240, 26-31. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Abulof, Uriel. “‘Back to the Future:’ A Comparative Ethical Look at Israeli Arab Future Vision Documents.” Israel Studies Forum 23(2), pp. 29-54.
Bishara, Azmi. “The Quest for Strategy.” Journal of Palestine Studies 32(2), pp 41-49. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Bishara, Azmi, Sara Scalenghe, Steve Rothman, and Joel Beinin. “On Palestinians in the Israeli Knesset: Interview with Azmi Bishara.” Middle East Report, 201, pp. 27-28, 30. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Gazzar, Brenda. “Balad candidate may be first Arab party woman MK.” The Jerusalem Post Online, 9 February 2009. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Glickman, Aviad. “Arab parties disqualified from elections.” ynetnews, 12 January 2009. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Glickman, Aviad. “Arab parties win disqualification appeal.” ynetnews, 21 January 2009. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Haaretz. “Balad: A country of all its citizens, cultural autonomy for Arabs.” 23 December 2002. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
“Israeli Election Source Kit.” Accessed 21 July 2010 at
Jamal, Amal. “The Arab Leadership in Israel: Ascendance and Fragmentation.” Journal of Palestine Studies 35(2), pp. 6-22. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Jewish Virtual Library. “National Democratic Party (Balad).” The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise. 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Katz, Yaakov. “Gaza flotilla finally sets out.” The Jerusalem Post Online. 30 May 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Khoury, Jack and Yoav Stern. “Balad member, former MK Miari: ‘Syria is not an enemy country.’” Haaretz Online. 18 September 2006. Accessed 21 July 2010 at
Knesset. “Azmi Bishara.” 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Knesset. “Hanin Zoabi.” 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Knesset. “National Democratic Assembly (Balad).” 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Lis, Jonathan. “Bill giving job preferences to IDF graduates faces appeal.” Haaretz Online. 12 July 2010. Accessed 18 July 2010 at
Lis, Jonathan. “Knesset committee to discuss ‘Hanin Zuabi’ law.” Haaretz Online. 5 June 2010. Accessed 18 July 2010 at
Mair, Lucy. “Off the Map: Land and Housing Rights Violations in Israel’s Unrecognized Bedouin Villages.” Human Rights Watch Online. 30 March 2008. Accessed 21 July 2010 at
NDA. “National Democratic Assembly – NDA.” 5 February 2009. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
NDA. “National Democratic Assembly PRESS RELEASE.” 24 September 2002. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Peretz, Don and Gideon Doron. “Sectarian Politics and the Peace Process: The 1999 Israel Elections.” Middle East Journal 54(2), 259-273. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Rekhess, Elie. “The Arab Minority in Israel and the Seventeenth Knesset Elections: The Beginning of a New Era?,” in Arian Asher and Michael Shamir, eds. The Elections in Israel 2006. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 2008.
Scheindlin, Dahlia. “Bring Arabs into the coalition.” Haaretz Online. 25 June 2010. Accessed online 18 July 2010 at
Sokol, Samuel. “New Balad MK praises Iran’s nuke quest.” The Jerusalem Post Online. 31 March 2009. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Stoil, Rebecca Anna. “Knesset revokes Zoabi’s MK rights.” The Jerusalem Post Online. 13 July 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Stoil, Rebecca Anna. “Zoabi: ‘Confrontation was not our goal.’“ The Jerusalem Post Online. 2 June 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010 at
Zionist Negotiations with the Sultan
“If His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could in return undertake the complete management of the finances of Turkey. ” This sentence appears in one of the first published statements of Zionism, Theodor Herzl’s “The Jewish State.” This paper will explore the early Zionist negotiations with the Ottoman Empire for the land of Palestine. After a historical glance at the Jewish longing for the land of Palestine, I will examine the negotiations Theodor Herzl undertook with the Ottoman Sultan in an attempt to buy the state. The focus will be on Herzl’s quest for a charter. Herzl asserted in “The Jewish State” that “My proposal can be carried out only with the free consent of a majority of Jews. ” But with his campaign for a “charter,” Herzl seemed to believe that his proposal could be carried out only with the consent of the world as well. I will explore what Zionism turned to when the charter failed to come through, analyzing Ottoman reactions to the growing possibility of a Jewish state in Palestine.
Wanting Palestine
Mim Kemal Oke states that the Jews “came to realize” they were “a separate nation, bound by a common faith and sentiment rather than by land. ” Herzl, who believed the “Jewish Question” arose due to Antisemitism, would most likely concur. Other Zionists (especially more religiously observant Jews), though, would disagree violently. For Jews were bound to the land of Palestine through their history, their religion. Hibbat Zion – the Love of Zion – was a powerful force and was focused on a specific land. While Herzl seriously considered Argentina (“Argentina is one of the most fertile countries in the world, extends over a vast area, is sparsely populated, and has a temperate climate. ”), Pines believed that Argentina “will never be able to compete with Palestine. For the one advantage of the sanctity of tradition will, in the end, prevail, even in the practical sphere, over all the economic advantages possessed by other countries. ” Herzl knew, though that “Palestine is our unforgettable historic homeland. They very name would be a marvelously effective rallying cry. ” He believed the best way to do this was to obtain a charter from the Ottoman Empire. “Let us express it in a single word: A Charter! Our efforts are directed at obtaining a Charter from the Turkish government, a Charter under the sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan. Only when we are in possession of this Charter, which will have to include the necessary guarantees under public law, will we be able to begin large-scale practical settlement. In return for granting us this Charter we shall secure great benefits for the Turkish government. ” But though Herzl went with great gusto for Palestine, the idea of Argentina was not entirely discarded. Indeed, he even thought to use it as a bargaining chip in his negotiations with the Sultan. Herzl thought that showing the Sultan the Jews were willing to go elsewhere might pressure him into action, though the Zionists were not unanimous in this assumption . Nevlinski, Herzl’s main contact with the Turkish Sultan, told the Sultan that “If the Jews cannot obtain Palestine, they will undoubtedly turn to Argentina” in June of 1896, doubtless thinking this might worry him over the possible loss of finances. But it was clear from public Jewish sentiment and the words of Zionist Congresses that they wanted Palestine, and would do quite a lot to get it.
Hibbat Zion and the Jewish history in the Palestinian region gave them a strong claim, but it may have proved to their disadvantage as well. In insisting on Palestine, the claim that Zionism was primarily political was undermined. Additionally, this assumption that the Jews were justified in having Palestine affected the tone and methodology with which Zionists (not only Herzl) went about attempting to win the region. They would not have made these assumptions with Argentina. And they likely would have had an easier time obtaining a charter for Argentina than in Palestine. Nonetheless, Palestine it had to be. Seeing Jews already living in Palestine under Ottoman rule strengthened the desire – and the belief that it was attainable. Pines believed that “experience has demonstrated how strong is the prospect of ultimate success in Palestine. ”
“Buying” a State – Negotiations with the Turkish Sultan
Herzl’s hope was to essentially “buy” a state from the Ottoman Empire. In exchange for the Jewish consolidation of the Empire’s debt, the Jews would receive autonomy (and, hoped Herzl, independence) in Palestine. The Turkish Sultan was sent greetings by the First Zionist Congress. Though they were not formally acknowledged, Herzl believed that the Sultan sent a representative/spy to that first Congress . But the Sultan acknowledged the telegram sent during the Second Zionist Congress (1898), something which Herzl “never counted on. ”
Several routes to the Sultan were attempted. Arminius Vambery, a Hungarian traveler with the Sultan’s ear who Herzl called “uncle,” promised a meeting with the Sultan in exchange for payment, though his initial attempt failed. Philip Michael Von Nevlinski, a Polish count, was sympathetic and also had the Sultan’s ear. He guided Herzl in his 1896 visit to Constantinople, the first of five. When he was in Constantinople, Herzl willingly bribed Ottoman officials in attempts to gain an audience with the Sultan himself . Though he was summoned repeatedly by Constantinople (the last of which came in 1902 ), he often was not received by the Sultan himself. Nonetheless, Herzl continued going and talked to anyone he was able to. He believed that “to drop Turkey was to drop everything. ”
The Sultan himself claimed to be “a friend of the Jews. Indeed I rely mainly on the Moslems and Jews. I haven’t the same degree of confidence in my other subjects. ” Antisemitism never took root in Turkey . Though this can hardly be seen as a negative thing, it may have impacted the Sultan’s hesitation – unlike some European leaders and Jews, he did not see the “crisis” many Jews were living in under Antisemitism. Additionally, the Sultan “was almost obsessed with fear,” in the words of Germany’s Eulenburg . Though he was friendly to the Jews, the Sultan was nervous about additional national minorities in his Empire that could stir up trouble .
In his first trip to Constantinople, undertaken in 1896, Herzl did not meet the Sultan. He stated at one point that he had no intention of going unless he was assured of an audience – and he thought Nevlinski had already arranged one. Despite the lack of an audience with the Sultan himself, the trip was not an absolute failure. He was able to speak with several of the Sultan’s advisors, and Nevlinski was able to discuss the issue with ‘Abd al-Hamid. On 18 June 1896, Herzl spoke with the son of the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey, who was a young State Councillor. Djavid’s first objection was Jerusalem, leading Herzl to state in his diary that he believed “we must ultimately concede that Jerusalem shall remain as it is. ” (It is interesting to note that Herzl’s other suggestion for this was remarkably similar to the UN’s proposal in the Partition Plan. He campaigned for “a far-reaching exterritoriality. The Holy Places of the civilized world should belong to no one but must belong to all. ”) Herzl also told Djavid he believed Palestine could form a vassalage to the Ottoman Empire, already showing his willingness to make concessions as necessary to get a form of autonomy if not full sovereignty. When Djavid asked Herzl what typed of government the Jewish community would be and Herzl told him “An aristocratic republic,” Djavid “roundly disapproved: ‘Say whatever you please to the Sultan, but not the word “Republic.” People here are mortally afraid of it. They fear the spread of this revolutionary form of government, like an epidemic, from one province to another. ’” On 19 June in speaking to Khalil Rifat Pasha, Herzl “had the impression that he not only looked with disfavor on the project but distrusted it. ” On 19 June, Nevlinski spoke with Herzl about the Sultan’s opinion of the matter.
The Sultan told me: if Mr. Herzl is your friend in the same measure as you are mine, then advise him not to go a single step further in the matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me but to my people. They have won this Empire and fertilized it with their blood. We will cover it once more with our blood, before we allow it to be torn from us. Two of my regiments from Syria and Palestine allowed themselves to be killed to a man at Plevna. Not one of them yielded; one and all remained, dead, upon the field. The Turkish people own the Turkish Empire, not I. I can dispose of no part of it. The Jews may spare their millions. When my Empire is divided, perhaps they will get Palestine for nothing. But only our corpse can be divided. I will never consent to vivisection.
This obsession with keeping the Empire together was consistent and seems to have been the Sultan’s driving force. When Nevlinski suggested to the Sultan that he bring the Young Turks into the government (the same group that was later to depose him), ‘Abd al-Hamid replied “A constitution, then? I know this much: Poland’s constitution did not prevent your fatherland from being partitioned. ”
In spite of the negative language reported to Herzl, “Nevlinski says he is convinced that the Turks are willing to give us Palestine. ” “[The Sultan] couldn’t receive you now, because your project hadn’t remained secret…since the Sultan would have been obliged to reject your proposal in its present form, he preferred not to talk about it at all. But he said to me, ‘The Jews are intelligent, they are bound to find an acceptable form.’ It would appear from this that the Sultan merely wishes to sauver les apparences, and I believe that in the end he will come round. ” What came out of Herzl’s first visit to Constantinople was not merely words, either. “The Sultan [continued Nevlinski] now expects you to help in the Armenian business. Furthermore, he would like you to obtain for him a loan tied to a lien on the light-house revenues. For that purpose he is sending you the contract with Collas. The annual revenue is ₤.T.45,000; the loan should amount to two million pounds. ”
Herzl was culturally aware enough not to write a “manifesto” to the Sultan, admitting his to be a “typically English notion,” instead desiring a private negotiation . He finally got his desired “private negotiation” in 1901, thanks to “Uncle Vambery.” The meeting that took place on 19 May was long and political. Herzl and the Sultan, through an interpreter, meandered between topics of small talk and implicit statements. After the obligatory salaamiks and greetings, though, Herzl was able to get to the point. “The thorn, as I see it, is your public debt. If that could be removed, the vitality of Turkey, in which I have great faith, would develop new strength. ” The Sultan agreed the debt was a thorn and that he would be glad to be rid of it. Herzl asked that a plan be sent to him regarding the unification of the debt, but that this plan must be secret. After all, Europe was desperate to undermine the Empire. Herzl then pointed to how mutually beneficial Jewish settlement in the Palestinian region might be: “All that this beautiful land needs is the industrial activity of our people. In general, Europeans who come here enrich themselves quickly and then hasten away with their spoils. An entrepreneur should by all means make a decent and honest profit, but he ought to remain in the country where his wealth was acquired. ” The Sultan makes no explicit promises, though “referred to himself as a friend of the Jews and promised them his lasting protection if they sought refuge in his lands. ” For now, though, Herzl would send the Sultan “a capable financier who could create new resources for the country ” and wait for the consolidation plan. In return, he requested “a pro-Jewish pronouncement at a moment [Herzl] would designate ([he] was thinking of the Congress)…All this was promised [him].”
In 1901, Izzet came to Herzl with the plan for consolidation of the public debt, but it was a “thieves’ plan on the fact of it.” Herzl felt like the Turks were simply trying to bleed the Jews, but he played the game in hopes of achieving what he desired. In February 1902, Herzl was once again summoned to Constantinople. He did not see the Sultan. Once again, he felt played, as “Concessions were offered him for the exploitation of mines, the establishment of a pro-government bank, and the creation of a land company for settling Jewish immigrants – but, as expressly stipulated, not in Palestine. He soon had convincing proof that the whole performance was staged in order to play him off against a French financial and political combine, headed by the French Minister of Finance, Maurice Rouvier, who got nowhere either – but perhaps not so fast as Herzl. ”
Herzl’s last trip to Constantinople was full of “assurances of continued interest and good will,” but he once again “left empty-handed. ” That was in 1902. In 1904, Herzl died, having been fully disenchanted from his belief that he could simply “buy” a state. In the year before his death, he negotiated for mere settlement in the sanjak of Acre . Still, the Ottomans refused. From the Zionist standpoint, the repeated refusals seemed illogical: the Ottoman Empire desperately needed funds, yet would not take them, even though Herzl only ever used language of the desire for agricultural land with the Sultan. ‘Abd al-Hamid was convinced that they wanted their own government (which was a fully justified fear) . His ambassador in Berlin, Ahmed Tewfik Pasa, believed “we must have no illusions about Zionism. Although the speakers at the Congress dwelled upon vague generalities such as the future of the Jewish people, the Zionists, in effect, aim at the formation of a great Jewish State in Palestine, which would also spread towards the neighbouring countries. ” The Ottomans did not wish to deal with another nationality in their borders. In short, they did not desire their own “Jewish Question.” Additionally, the Sultan greatly feared the growing influence of the Great Powers of Europe. Zionism, a movement seemingly led by highly educated and influential Europeans, was seen to be another European arm of influence in the region, and was thus indesirable.
“Begging” for a State – Seeking International Support
Initially, Herzl believed the charter for a Jewish state or autonomous region must come from the Ottoman Empire, as they were the undisputed authority over the Palestinian region. It quickly became clear, though, that this would not happen easily. So even as he pursued negotiations with the Turkish Sultan, Herzl talked with other powers in the world in an attempt to get them on board. He hoped that other nations might put pressure on the Ottoman Empire, which was increasingly feeling pressure from Europe.
The hope of European pressure on the Jew’s behalf in Palestine came before the idea of Zionism. In 1863, Ha-Magid, a Hebrew Journal, included a belief that
if the House of Rothschild and Sir Moses Montefiore stood at its head, together with the leaders of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Alliance Israelite Universelle, and other notables who have the strength to stand in the courts of kings and speak for their brothers, then the Society would, with the help of God, reach its goal; then the government of Turkey would, at the request of the kings of Europe, protect those of our brothers who work at the land of their fathers.
This seemed to many Jews to be a rather far-reaching idea: European nations, themselves full of Antisemitism, who could barely be bothered to intercede for Jews in their own borders, were hardly going to “waste” their political influence pushing the Ottoman Sultan to permit immigration. Nonetheless, the hope prevailed and Herzl talked with several kings and statesmen.
From the beginning, Herzl hoped Europe would be on good relations with Europe. “We should there form a part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism. We should as a neutral state remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence. ”
“Italy can do a great deal for us, for the Sultan is afraid of Italy.” Herzl petitioned the king of Italy in January 1903. The king was sympathetic, though he tells him “Ma e ancora casa di altri” (“Again it is someone else’s house.”) and “I can promise nothing definite. But whenever I meet a Turk, I shall take up your cause with him. ” When the Italian monarch told Herzl “The only thing that has any effect on him is money. If you promise him, in return for the Jordan valley, half the profit it brings, he’ll let you have it,” Herzl told him “Yes, but we require autonomy.” In reply, the king warned Herzl that “He dislikes the word. ”
Jewish emigration from Russia was forbidden at the turn of the century, but the Russian official de Plehve believed “a modification of the law in that respect was necessary. Perhaps other reforms might also be possible.” He further stated that “the Russian Government would welcome permission granted by the Ottoman Government to Jews to enter Palestine. Hence he was not an adversary of pure Zionism; but he had begun to fear that political Zionism was no more than a chimera. Nevertheless he would not oppose the encouragement of Zionist ideas in Russia provided they favoured emigration. Besides, within Russia itself the Zionist ideas were perhaps useful in fighting those of socialism. ” But the Russians did not push ‘Abd al-Hamid for a Charter.
The most influential country in regards to the Ottoman Empire, and the one that Herzl had the most contact with, was Germany. The Ottomans were weak militarily and Germany was the foremost military power in Europe . As Germany’s influence grew, it penetrated Turkey and the Kaiser had an incredible amount of power in the Ottoman Empire. Herzl made the following five points to Eulenburg, a close confidant of Wilhelm II’s and a German diplomat:
1. In various countries Zionism might lessen the danger of socialism, since it was often dissatisfied Jews who provided the revolutionary parties with leaders and ideas.
2. A reduction in Jewish numbers would weaken anti-Semitim.
3. Turkey stood to gain from the influx of an intelligent and energetic element into Palestine. Large sums of money injected into her economy and the increase in trade would improve her finances.
4. The Jews would bring civilization and order back to a neglected corner of the Orient.
5. A railroad from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was a European necessity. ‘The Jews could and must build this great road of the nations which, if undertaken otherwise, might call forth the most serious rivalries.
Eulenburg agreed, and the Emperor came around to this way of thinking as well, at least verbally. On 28 September 1898, Herzl received a letter from Eulenburg stating
His Majesty would discuss the matter with the Sultan in a most emphatic manner and will be pleased to hear more from you in Jerusalem. The Kaiser has already issued orders to the effect that no obstacle is to be placed in the way of the [Zionist] delegation.
In conclusion, H.M. wishes to tell you that he is very much prepared to undertake the protectorate in question. His Majesty, naturally, counts on your discretion in conveying this information.
In his meeting with Herzl, the Kaiser asked him to “Tell me in a word what I am to ask of the Sultan.” Herzl replied “A Chartered Company – under German protection. ”
In a letter to his uncle, the Grand Duke, dated 29 September 1898, Wilhelm II said
I am convinced that the settlement of the Holy Land by the wealthy and industrious people of Israel [Volk Israel] will bring unexampled prosperity and blessings to the Holy Land, which may do much to revive and develop Asia Minor. Such a settlement would bring millions into the purse of the Turks and of the upper class and effendis and so gradually help to save the ‘Sick Man’ from bankruptcy. In this way the disagreeable Eastern question would be imperceptibly separated from the Mediterranean…The Turk will recover, getting his money without borrowing, and will be able to build his own highways and railways without foreign companies and then it would not be so easy to dismember Turkey. And besides, “would it not be an immense achievement for Germany, if the world of the Hebrews looked to her with gratitude?
Though German sentiment was not static or fully consensual (Wilhelmstrasse stated that “intervention by Germany in favour of Herzl’s ‘Jewish State’ would inflict irreparable damage on all our other interests in Turkey ”), the Kaiser told the Ottoman Sultan “The Zionists are not dangerous to Turkey, but the Jews are everywhere a nuisance we should like to be rid of. ” The Sultan disagreed, becoming ever more fearful of European influence as time went by and European power grew. During Wilhelm II’s 1889 tour of Jerusalem, Tewfik Pasa told him that “the Sultan would have nothing to do with Zionism and an independent Jewish Kingdom,” and that Zionism “would assure the ruin of Turkey.” The Kaiser withdrew support, not wishing to injure the goodwill of the Sultan.
Despite his attempts, Herzl failed to obtain a charter from the Ottomans or any other country. A few select European countries placed light pressure on the Empire, though most of them asked for greater immigration and settlement allotments rather than an autonomous region.
With the deposition of ‘Abd al-Hamid and the appearance of Ottoman weakness, the Great Powers began to await developments in Turkey. Several Zionists argued they should do the same . In this political limbo, Zionists believed their goal should be “to the further development of our work of information and enlightenment in Turkey.” With “the progressive development of the Ottoman Empire,” Zionists “cherish[ed] the firm conviction that our efforts will lead to the most favourable results.” They believed “activity in Palestine which we regard as the basis of all Zionist work,” needs to be “continued systematically. ” With this, the Zionist movement turned away from the idea of buying a state or obtaining a charter and towards the idea of building a state through immigration and land purchases.
Building a State – Immigration and Land Sales
‘Abd al-Hamid told Herzl that any Jewish immigrants to Palestine needed to become Ottoman subjects. Herzl agreed. But many Jews infiltrated into the region (through bribery and the lax enforcement of the Sultan’s commands) and then acquired foreign protection . In those days, foreign citizens living in the Ottoman Empire could become legally-protected “protégés” of European powers .
The Ottoman fear of Jewish immigration was not new. Foreign Jews other than religious pilgrims were forbidden from visiting Palestine as early as 1882 . The Antisemitism and hunger in Romania in 1899 led to the “Conditions of Entry into the Holy Land by Hebrew Visitors” of 21 November 2000, a pamphlet with firm restrictions on Jewish visitations to Palestine. Before November 2000, Jews paid a deposit and, if they left after one month as legally required, were given their money back. (Many Jews chose to lose this money, seeing it as an “immigration charge,” in exchange for remaining in their Holy Land.) After November 2000, the Jews – this time including Ottoman subjects – obtained a residence permit good for three months. Upon leaving, the “Red Tickets” were returned. Registers were compiled each month and pilgrims with expired permits were expelled, though not treated harshly . But it was not easy to tell the difference between a Gentile European and a Jewish protégé. Escaping Turkish restrictions was relatively easy .
Immigration was not the only concern of the Ottoman Empire. Another primary concern was Jewish purchase of land in the region. Ottoman law stated that “subjects of foreign governments are allowed to take advantage of the rights to possess property within or without towns in every part of the Imperial dominions with the exception of the Hejaz lands, in the same way as Ottoman subjects.” This included Jews. One of the greatest Jewish landowners was philanthropist Baron de Rothschild.
Baron Edmond de Rothchild spent a great sum of money and established big companies in Europe in order to found a Jewish state in Palestine; then he opened branches of these companies in the Ottoman Empire and began land expropriation in Palestine. Thus, some parts of Palestine and Syria were expropriated. These abused the poor condition of the Ottoman subjects and the ill-will of the state officials in order to help the Jewish in greater extents.
The sale of land to Jews was at least equally troubling to the Ottoman Empire, as it allowed for greater Jewish settlement and gave Jews in the region a stronger claim. In response to their fear, the Turkish government passed another law on 5 March 1883 to prevent Jews from gaining land in Palestine. Ottomans Jews, though, could still acquire the land. Many Ottoman Jews worked as middlemen, until another law prevented transactions for all Jews .
The European powers, which did not do enough in Herzl’s eyes to help obtain a charter, did help with land sales: Following the passage of the strictest law, “there were loud protests from foreigners-Jewish and Gentile-who had invested in land. The embassies in Istanbul took up their cause, protesting a manifest breach of the Capitulations. As with the entry of individual Jewish settlers, the Powers were able in 1893 to extract a concession from the Porte regarding land purchase. Foreign Jews, legally resident in Palestine, would be permitted to buy land on condition that they could prove their legal status in the country and undertook not to let ‘illegal Jews’ live on their land (if urban) or set up a colony on it (if rural). ”
These actions were not applauded by all Zionists; indeed, the most politically-minded of the Zionists believed that those Jews who purchased land and immigrated to Palestine while Herzl was negotiating with the Sultan for a chartered autonomy in Palestine undermined his efforts. In June of 1896, “Bierer told me at Sofia that Edmond de Rothschild had sent his representative to Constantinople a few days ago, to offer the Sultan money for permission to extend the colonization [in Palestine].” Herzl worried “Can this be a chess move against me? ” At the First Zionist Congress (September 1897),
A certain [Dr. Solomon] Mandelkern, for instance, arose and moved a vote of thanks to Baron Edmond de Rothschild. I ruled the motion out of order on a question of principle – namely, the policy of infiltration [into Palestine]. I crushed Mandelkern by saying that he was plunging the Congress into the dilemma of having to choose between a semblance of ingratitude toward a benevolent enterprise and the abandonment of our principles.
Though some Zionists, especially Herzl, saw these actions as counterproductive, when Herzl died without obtaining a charter, these actions may well have kept the possibility of a Jewish state alive. After all, it was the land purchased by Jews and the land that was heavily settled by Jews that was eventually made into the Jewish state of Israel.
Vital said the failure of Herzl’s negotiations with the Sultan was “the most painful and frustrating, the least fruitful, and the most costly in time, money, and nervous energy expended ” of the Zionist efforts. Nonetheless, though the Ottoman Empire did not hand the Jewish state to Herzl on a silver platter, it played a large role in the state’s emergence. The relative lack of Antisemitism in Turkey and the dhimmi laws of Islam meant that Jewish life under Ottoman rule was fairly decent. Lax legal enforcement allowed for Jews to arrive in the region, legally or not, and evade deportation. This was critical to the formation of institutions and a Jewish majority in certain areas. In turn, these factors were critical in the eventual formation of the Jewish state in the region of Palestine. Buying a state did not work. Building a state did, though the Jews did not (as ‘Abd al-Hamid stated at one point may be possible) “get Palestine for nothing. ”
Bibliography
Batmaz, Sakir. “Illegal Jewish-Immigration Policy in Palestine (Periods of 1st and 2nd Constitutional Monarchy).” Turkish Studies: International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic 3(1) Winter 2008.
Friedman, Isaiah. 1977. Germany, Turkey, and Zionism 1897-1918. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hertzberg, Arthur, ed. 1959. The Zionist Idea. Philadelphia.
Herzl, Theodor. Lowenthal, Marvin, ed. and trans. 1956. “The Diaries of Theodor Herzl. New York: The Dial Press.
Oke, Mim Kemal. 1982. “The Ottoman Empire, Zionism, and the Question of Palestine (1880-1908).” International Journal of Middle East Studies 14(3 Aug 1982), 329-341. Cambridge University Press.
Vital, David. 1975. “The Origins of Zionism” Oxford: Clarendon Press.
------. 1982. “Zionism: the Formative Years.” Oxford: Clarendon Press.
------. 1987. “Zionism: the Crucial Phase.” Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wanting Palestine
Mim Kemal Oke states that the Jews “came to realize” they were “a separate nation, bound by a common faith and sentiment rather than by land. ” Herzl, who believed the “Jewish Question” arose due to Antisemitism, would most likely concur. Other Zionists (especially more religiously observant Jews), though, would disagree violently. For Jews were bound to the land of Palestine through their history, their religion. Hibbat Zion – the Love of Zion – was a powerful force and was focused on a specific land. While Herzl seriously considered Argentina (“Argentina is one of the most fertile countries in the world, extends over a vast area, is sparsely populated, and has a temperate climate. ”), Pines believed that Argentina “will never be able to compete with Palestine. For the one advantage of the sanctity of tradition will, in the end, prevail, even in the practical sphere, over all the economic advantages possessed by other countries. ” Herzl knew, though that “Palestine is our unforgettable historic homeland. They very name would be a marvelously effective rallying cry. ” He believed the best way to do this was to obtain a charter from the Ottoman Empire. “Let us express it in a single word: A Charter! Our efforts are directed at obtaining a Charter from the Turkish government, a Charter under the sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan. Only when we are in possession of this Charter, which will have to include the necessary guarantees under public law, will we be able to begin large-scale practical settlement. In return for granting us this Charter we shall secure great benefits for the Turkish government. ” But though Herzl went with great gusto for Palestine, the idea of Argentina was not entirely discarded. Indeed, he even thought to use it as a bargaining chip in his negotiations with the Sultan. Herzl thought that showing the Sultan the Jews were willing to go elsewhere might pressure him into action, though the Zionists were not unanimous in this assumption . Nevlinski, Herzl’s main contact with the Turkish Sultan, told the Sultan that “If the Jews cannot obtain Palestine, they will undoubtedly turn to Argentina” in June of 1896, doubtless thinking this might worry him over the possible loss of finances. But it was clear from public Jewish sentiment and the words of Zionist Congresses that they wanted Palestine, and would do quite a lot to get it.
Hibbat Zion and the Jewish history in the Palestinian region gave them a strong claim, but it may have proved to their disadvantage as well. In insisting on Palestine, the claim that Zionism was primarily political was undermined. Additionally, this assumption that the Jews were justified in having Palestine affected the tone and methodology with which Zionists (not only Herzl) went about attempting to win the region. They would not have made these assumptions with Argentina. And they likely would have had an easier time obtaining a charter for Argentina than in Palestine. Nonetheless, Palestine it had to be. Seeing Jews already living in Palestine under Ottoman rule strengthened the desire – and the belief that it was attainable. Pines believed that “experience has demonstrated how strong is the prospect of ultimate success in Palestine. ”
“Buying” a State – Negotiations with the Turkish Sultan
Herzl’s hope was to essentially “buy” a state from the Ottoman Empire. In exchange for the Jewish consolidation of the Empire’s debt, the Jews would receive autonomy (and, hoped Herzl, independence) in Palestine. The Turkish Sultan was sent greetings by the First Zionist Congress. Though they were not formally acknowledged, Herzl believed that the Sultan sent a representative/spy to that first Congress . But the Sultan acknowledged the telegram sent during the Second Zionist Congress (1898), something which Herzl “never counted on. ”
Several routes to the Sultan were attempted. Arminius Vambery, a Hungarian traveler with the Sultan’s ear who Herzl called “uncle,” promised a meeting with the Sultan in exchange for payment, though his initial attempt failed. Philip Michael Von Nevlinski, a Polish count, was sympathetic and also had the Sultan’s ear. He guided Herzl in his 1896 visit to Constantinople, the first of five. When he was in Constantinople, Herzl willingly bribed Ottoman officials in attempts to gain an audience with the Sultan himself . Though he was summoned repeatedly by Constantinople (the last of which came in 1902 ), he often was not received by the Sultan himself. Nonetheless, Herzl continued going and talked to anyone he was able to. He believed that “to drop Turkey was to drop everything. ”
The Sultan himself claimed to be “a friend of the Jews. Indeed I rely mainly on the Moslems and Jews. I haven’t the same degree of confidence in my other subjects. ” Antisemitism never took root in Turkey . Though this can hardly be seen as a negative thing, it may have impacted the Sultan’s hesitation – unlike some European leaders and Jews, he did not see the “crisis” many Jews were living in under Antisemitism. Additionally, the Sultan “was almost obsessed with fear,” in the words of Germany’s Eulenburg . Though he was friendly to the Jews, the Sultan was nervous about additional national minorities in his Empire that could stir up trouble .
In his first trip to Constantinople, undertaken in 1896, Herzl did not meet the Sultan. He stated at one point that he had no intention of going unless he was assured of an audience – and he thought Nevlinski had already arranged one. Despite the lack of an audience with the Sultan himself, the trip was not an absolute failure. He was able to speak with several of the Sultan’s advisors, and Nevlinski was able to discuss the issue with ‘Abd al-Hamid. On 18 June 1896, Herzl spoke with the son of the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey, who was a young State Councillor. Djavid’s first objection was Jerusalem, leading Herzl to state in his diary that he believed “we must ultimately concede that Jerusalem shall remain as it is. ” (It is interesting to note that Herzl’s other suggestion for this was remarkably similar to the UN’s proposal in the Partition Plan. He campaigned for “a far-reaching exterritoriality. The Holy Places of the civilized world should belong to no one but must belong to all. ”) Herzl also told Djavid he believed Palestine could form a vassalage to the Ottoman Empire, already showing his willingness to make concessions as necessary to get a form of autonomy if not full sovereignty. When Djavid asked Herzl what typed of government the Jewish community would be and Herzl told him “An aristocratic republic,” Djavid “roundly disapproved: ‘Say whatever you please to the Sultan, but not the word “Republic.” People here are mortally afraid of it. They fear the spread of this revolutionary form of government, like an epidemic, from one province to another. ’” On 19 June in speaking to Khalil Rifat Pasha, Herzl “had the impression that he not only looked with disfavor on the project but distrusted it. ” On 19 June, Nevlinski spoke with Herzl about the Sultan’s opinion of the matter.
The Sultan told me: if Mr. Herzl is your friend in the same measure as you are mine, then advise him not to go a single step further in the matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me but to my people. They have won this Empire and fertilized it with their blood. We will cover it once more with our blood, before we allow it to be torn from us. Two of my regiments from Syria and Palestine allowed themselves to be killed to a man at Plevna. Not one of them yielded; one and all remained, dead, upon the field. The Turkish people own the Turkish Empire, not I. I can dispose of no part of it. The Jews may spare their millions. When my Empire is divided, perhaps they will get Palestine for nothing. But only our corpse can be divided. I will never consent to vivisection.
This obsession with keeping the Empire together was consistent and seems to have been the Sultan’s driving force. When Nevlinski suggested to the Sultan that he bring the Young Turks into the government (the same group that was later to depose him), ‘Abd al-Hamid replied “A constitution, then? I know this much: Poland’s constitution did not prevent your fatherland from being partitioned. ”
In spite of the negative language reported to Herzl, “Nevlinski says he is convinced that the Turks are willing to give us Palestine. ” “[The Sultan] couldn’t receive you now, because your project hadn’t remained secret…since the Sultan would have been obliged to reject your proposal in its present form, he preferred not to talk about it at all. But he said to me, ‘The Jews are intelligent, they are bound to find an acceptable form.’ It would appear from this that the Sultan merely wishes to sauver les apparences, and I believe that in the end he will come round. ” What came out of Herzl’s first visit to Constantinople was not merely words, either. “The Sultan [continued Nevlinski] now expects you to help in the Armenian business. Furthermore, he would like you to obtain for him a loan tied to a lien on the light-house revenues. For that purpose he is sending you the contract with Collas. The annual revenue is ₤.T.45,000; the loan should amount to two million pounds. ”
Herzl was culturally aware enough not to write a “manifesto” to the Sultan, admitting his to be a “typically English notion,” instead desiring a private negotiation . He finally got his desired “private negotiation” in 1901, thanks to “Uncle Vambery.” The meeting that took place on 19 May was long and political. Herzl and the Sultan, through an interpreter, meandered between topics of small talk and implicit statements. After the obligatory salaamiks and greetings, though, Herzl was able to get to the point. “The thorn, as I see it, is your public debt. If that could be removed, the vitality of Turkey, in which I have great faith, would develop new strength. ” The Sultan agreed the debt was a thorn and that he would be glad to be rid of it. Herzl asked that a plan be sent to him regarding the unification of the debt, but that this plan must be secret. After all, Europe was desperate to undermine the Empire. Herzl then pointed to how mutually beneficial Jewish settlement in the Palestinian region might be: “All that this beautiful land needs is the industrial activity of our people. In general, Europeans who come here enrich themselves quickly and then hasten away with their spoils. An entrepreneur should by all means make a decent and honest profit, but he ought to remain in the country where his wealth was acquired. ” The Sultan makes no explicit promises, though “referred to himself as a friend of the Jews and promised them his lasting protection if they sought refuge in his lands. ” For now, though, Herzl would send the Sultan “a capable financier who could create new resources for the country ” and wait for the consolidation plan. In return, he requested “a pro-Jewish pronouncement at a moment [Herzl] would designate ([he] was thinking of the Congress)…All this was promised [him].”
In 1901, Izzet came to Herzl with the plan for consolidation of the public debt, but it was a “thieves’ plan on the fact of it.” Herzl felt like the Turks were simply trying to bleed the Jews, but he played the game in hopes of achieving what he desired. In February 1902, Herzl was once again summoned to Constantinople. He did not see the Sultan. Once again, he felt played, as “Concessions were offered him for the exploitation of mines, the establishment of a pro-government bank, and the creation of a land company for settling Jewish immigrants – but, as expressly stipulated, not in Palestine. He soon had convincing proof that the whole performance was staged in order to play him off against a French financial and political combine, headed by the French Minister of Finance, Maurice Rouvier, who got nowhere either – but perhaps not so fast as Herzl. ”
Herzl’s last trip to Constantinople was full of “assurances of continued interest and good will,” but he once again “left empty-handed. ” That was in 1902. In 1904, Herzl died, having been fully disenchanted from his belief that he could simply “buy” a state. In the year before his death, he negotiated for mere settlement in the sanjak of Acre . Still, the Ottomans refused. From the Zionist standpoint, the repeated refusals seemed illogical: the Ottoman Empire desperately needed funds, yet would not take them, even though Herzl only ever used language of the desire for agricultural land with the Sultan. ‘Abd al-Hamid was convinced that they wanted their own government (which was a fully justified fear) . His ambassador in Berlin, Ahmed Tewfik Pasa, believed “we must have no illusions about Zionism. Although the speakers at the Congress dwelled upon vague generalities such as the future of the Jewish people, the Zionists, in effect, aim at the formation of a great Jewish State in Palestine, which would also spread towards the neighbouring countries. ” The Ottomans did not wish to deal with another nationality in their borders. In short, they did not desire their own “Jewish Question.” Additionally, the Sultan greatly feared the growing influence of the Great Powers of Europe. Zionism, a movement seemingly led by highly educated and influential Europeans, was seen to be another European arm of influence in the region, and was thus indesirable.
“Begging” for a State – Seeking International Support
Initially, Herzl believed the charter for a Jewish state or autonomous region must come from the Ottoman Empire, as they were the undisputed authority over the Palestinian region. It quickly became clear, though, that this would not happen easily. So even as he pursued negotiations with the Turkish Sultan, Herzl talked with other powers in the world in an attempt to get them on board. He hoped that other nations might put pressure on the Ottoman Empire, which was increasingly feeling pressure from Europe.
The hope of European pressure on the Jew’s behalf in Palestine came before the idea of Zionism. In 1863, Ha-Magid, a Hebrew Journal, included a belief that
if the House of Rothschild and Sir Moses Montefiore stood at its head, together with the leaders of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Alliance Israelite Universelle, and other notables who have the strength to stand in the courts of kings and speak for their brothers, then the Society would, with the help of God, reach its goal; then the government of Turkey would, at the request of the kings of Europe, protect those of our brothers who work at the land of their fathers.
This seemed to many Jews to be a rather far-reaching idea: European nations, themselves full of Antisemitism, who could barely be bothered to intercede for Jews in their own borders, were hardly going to “waste” their political influence pushing the Ottoman Sultan to permit immigration. Nonetheless, the hope prevailed and Herzl talked with several kings and statesmen.
From the beginning, Herzl hoped Europe would be on good relations with Europe. “We should there form a part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism. We should as a neutral state remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence. ”
“Italy can do a great deal for us, for the Sultan is afraid of Italy.” Herzl petitioned the king of Italy in January 1903. The king was sympathetic, though he tells him “Ma e ancora casa di altri” (“Again it is someone else’s house.”) and “I can promise nothing definite. But whenever I meet a Turk, I shall take up your cause with him. ” When the Italian monarch told Herzl “The only thing that has any effect on him is money. If you promise him, in return for the Jordan valley, half the profit it brings, he’ll let you have it,” Herzl told him “Yes, but we require autonomy.” In reply, the king warned Herzl that “He dislikes the word. ”
Jewish emigration from Russia was forbidden at the turn of the century, but the Russian official de Plehve believed “a modification of the law in that respect was necessary. Perhaps other reforms might also be possible.” He further stated that “the Russian Government would welcome permission granted by the Ottoman Government to Jews to enter Palestine. Hence he was not an adversary of pure Zionism; but he had begun to fear that political Zionism was no more than a chimera. Nevertheless he would not oppose the encouragement of Zionist ideas in Russia provided they favoured emigration. Besides, within Russia itself the Zionist ideas were perhaps useful in fighting those of socialism. ” But the Russians did not push ‘Abd al-Hamid for a Charter.
The most influential country in regards to the Ottoman Empire, and the one that Herzl had the most contact with, was Germany. The Ottomans were weak militarily and Germany was the foremost military power in Europe . As Germany’s influence grew, it penetrated Turkey and the Kaiser had an incredible amount of power in the Ottoman Empire. Herzl made the following five points to Eulenburg, a close confidant of Wilhelm II’s and a German diplomat:
1. In various countries Zionism might lessen the danger of socialism, since it was often dissatisfied Jews who provided the revolutionary parties with leaders and ideas.
2. A reduction in Jewish numbers would weaken anti-Semitim.
3. Turkey stood to gain from the influx of an intelligent and energetic element into Palestine. Large sums of money injected into her economy and the increase in trade would improve her finances.
4. The Jews would bring civilization and order back to a neglected corner of the Orient.
5. A railroad from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was a European necessity. ‘The Jews could and must build this great road of the nations which, if undertaken otherwise, might call forth the most serious rivalries.
Eulenburg agreed, and the Emperor came around to this way of thinking as well, at least verbally. On 28 September 1898, Herzl received a letter from Eulenburg stating
His Majesty would discuss the matter with the Sultan in a most emphatic manner and will be pleased to hear more from you in Jerusalem. The Kaiser has already issued orders to the effect that no obstacle is to be placed in the way of the [Zionist] delegation.
In conclusion, H.M. wishes to tell you that he is very much prepared to undertake the protectorate in question. His Majesty, naturally, counts on your discretion in conveying this information.
In his meeting with Herzl, the Kaiser asked him to “Tell me in a word what I am to ask of the Sultan.” Herzl replied “A Chartered Company – under German protection. ”
In a letter to his uncle, the Grand Duke, dated 29 September 1898, Wilhelm II said
I am convinced that the settlement of the Holy Land by the wealthy and industrious people of Israel [Volk Israel] will bring unexampled prosperity and blessings to the Holy Land, which may do much to revive and develop Asia Minor. Such a settlement would bring millions into the purse of the Turks and of the upper class and effendis and so gradually help to save the ‘Sick Man’ from bankruptcy. In this way the disagreeable Eastern question would be imperceptibly separated from the Mediterranean…The Turk will recover, getting his money without borrowing, and will be able to build his own highways and railways without foreign companies and then it would not be so easy to dismember Turkey. And besides, “would it not be an immense achievement for Germany, if the world of the Hebrews looked to her with gratitude?
Though German sentiment was not static or fully consensual (Wilhelmstrasse stated that “intervention by Germany in favour of Herzl’s ‘Jewish State’ would inflict irreparable damage on all our other interests in Turkey ”), the Kaiser told the Ottoman Sultan “The Zionists are not dangerous to Turkey, but the Jews are everywhere a nuisance we should like to be rid of. ” The Sultan disagreed, becoming ever more fearful of European influence as time went by and European power grew. During Wilhelm II’s 1889 tour of Jerusalem, Tewfik Pasa told him that “the Sultan would have nothing to do with Zionism and an independent Jewish Kingdom,” and that Zionism “would assure the ruin of Turkey.” The Kaiser withdrew support, not wishing to injure the goodwill of the Sultan.
Despite his attempts, Herzl failed to obtain a charter from the Ottomans or any other country. A few select European countries placed light pressure on the Empire, though most of them asked for greater immigration and settlement allotments rather than an autonomous region.
With the deposition of ‘Abd al-Hamid and the appearance of Ottoman weakness, the Great Powers began to await developments in Turkey. Several Zionists argued they should do the same . In this political limbo, Zionists believed their goal should be “to the further development of our work of information and enlightenment in Turkey.” With “the progressive development of the Ottoman Empire,” Zionists “cherish[ed] the firm conviction that our efforts will lead to the most favourable results.” They believed “activity in Palestine which we regard as the basis of all Zionist work,” needs to be “continued systematically. ” With this, the Zionist movement turned away from the idea of buying a state or obtaining a charter and towards the idea of building a state through immigration and land purchases.
Building a State – Immigration and Land Sales
‘Abd al-Hamid told Herzl that any Jewish immigrants to Palestine needed to become Ottoman subjects. Herzl agreed. But many Jews infiltrated into the region (through bribery and the lax enforcement of the Sultan’s commands) and then acquired foreign protection . In those days, foreign citizens living in the Ottoman Empire could become legally-protected “protégés” of European powers .
The Ottoman fear of Jewish immigration was not new. Foreign Jews other than religious pilgrims were forbidden from visiting Palestine as early as 1882 . The Antisemitism and hunger in Romania in 1899 led to the “Conditions of Entry into the Holy Land by Hebrew Visitors” of 21 November 2000, a pamphlet with firm restrictions on Jewish visitations to Palestine. Before November 2000, Jews paid a deposit and, if they left after one month as legally required, were given their money back. (Many Jews chose to lose this money, seeing it as an “immigration charge,” in exchange for remaining in their Holy Land.) After November 2000, the Jews – this time including Ottoman subjects – obtained a residence permit good for three months. Upon leaving, the “Red Tickets” were returned. Registers were compiled each month and pilgrims with expired permits were expelled, though not treated harshly . But it was not easy to tell the difference between a Gentile European and a Jewish protégé. Escaping Turkish restrictions was relatively easy .
Immigration was not the only concern of the Ottoman Empire. Another primary concern was Jewish purchase of land in the region. Ottoman law stated that “subjects of foreign governments are allowed to take advantage of the rights to possess property within or without towns in every part of the Imperial dominions with the exception of the Hejaz lands, in the same way as Ottoman subjects.” This included Jews. One of the greatest Jewish landowners was philanthropist Baron de Rothschild.
Baron Edmond de Rothchild spent a great sum of money and established big companies in Europe in order to found a Jewish state in Palestine; then he opened branches of these companies in the Ottoman Empire and began land expropriation in Palestine. Thus, some parts of Palestine and Syria were expropriated. These abused the poor condition of the Ottoman subjects and the ill-will of the state officials in order to help the Jewish in greater extents.
The sale of land to Jews was at least equally troubling to the Ottoman Empire, as it allowed for greater Jewish settlement and gave Jews in the region a stronger claim. In response to their fear, the Turkish government passed another law on 5 March 1883 to prevent Jews from gaining land in Palestine. Ottomans Jews, though, could still acquire the land. Many Ottoman Jews worked as middlemen, until another law prevented transactions for all Jews .
The European powers, which did not do enough in Herzl’s eyes to help obtain a charter, did help with land sales: Following the passage of the strictest law, “there were loud protests from foreigners-Jewish and Gentile-who had invested in land. The embassies in Istanbul took up their cause, protesting a manifest breach of the Capitulations. As with the entry of individual Jewish settlers, the Powers were able in 1893 to extract a concession from the Porte regarding land purchase. Foreign Jews, legally resident in Palestine, would be permitted to buy land on condition that they could prove their legal status in the country and undertook not to let ‘illegal Jews’ live on their land (if urban) or set up a colony on it (if rural). ”
These actions were not applauded by all Zionists; indeed, the most politically-minded of the Zionists believed that those Jews who purchased land and immigrated to Palestine while Herzl was negotiating with the Sultan for a chartered autonomy in Palestine undermined his efforts. In June of 1896, “Bierer told me at Sofia that Edmond de Rothschild had sent his representative to Constantinople a few days ago, to offer the Sultan money for permission to extend the colonization [in Palestine].” Herzl worried “Can this be a chess move against me? ” At the First Zionist Congress (September 1897),
A certain [Dr. Solomon] Mandelkern, for instance, arose and moved a vote of thanks to Baron Edmond de Rothschild. I ruled the motion out of order on a question of principle – namely, the policy of infiltration [into Palestine]. I crushed Mandelkern by saying that he was plunging the Congress into the dilemma of having to choose between a semblance of ingratitude toward a benevolent enterprise and the abandonment of our principles.
Though some Zionists, especially Herzl, saw these actions as counterproductive, when Herzl died without obtaining a charter, these actions may well have kept the possibility of a Jewish state alive. After all, it was the land purchased by Jews and the land that was heavily settled by Jews that was eventually made into the Jewish state of Israel.
Vital said the failure of Herzl’s negotiations with the Sultan was “the most painful and frustrating, the least fruitful, and the most costly in time, money, and nervous energy expended ” of the Zionist efforts. Nonetheless, though the Ottoman Empire did not hand the Jewish state to Herzl on a silver platter, it played a large role in the state’s emergence. The relative lack of Antisemitism in Turkey and the dhimmi laws of Islam meant that Jewish life under Ottoman rule was fairly decent. Lax legal enforcement allowed for Jews to arrive in the region, legally or not, and evade deportation. This was critical to the formation of institutions and a Jewish majority in certain areas. In turn, these factors were critical in the eventual formation of the Jewish state in the region of Palestine. Buying a state did not work. Building a state did, though the Jews did not (as ‘Abd al-Hamid stated at one point may be possible) “get Palestine for nothing. ”
Bibliography
Batmaz, Sakir. “Illegal Jewish-Immigration Policy in Palestine (Periods of 1st and 2nd Constitutional Monarchy).” Turkish Studies: International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic 3(1) Winter 2008.
Friedman, Isaiah. 1977. Germany, Turkey, and Zionism 1897-1918. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hertzberg, Arthur, ed. 1959. The Zionist Idea. Philadelphia.
Herzl, Theodor. Lowenthal, Marvin, ed. and trans. 1956. “The Diaries of Theodor Herzl. New York: The Dial Press.
Oke, Mim Kemal. 1982. “The Ottoman Empire, Zionism, and the Question of Palestine (1880-1908).” International Journal of Middle East Studies 14(3 Aug 1982), 329-341. Cambridge University Press.
Vital, David. 1975. “The Origins of Zionism” Oxford: Clarendon Press.
------. 1982. “Zionism: the Formative Years.” Oxford: Clarendon Press.
------. 1987. “Zionism: the Crucial Phase.” Oxford: Clarendon Press.
And we're done!
Courses are all finished. Had our last session with Yael. Had my last class with Dave. Finished up Dave's paper and emailed it in to him.
Tear. No more work...but wait! I have things to do in the United States!
Huzzah. : )
Tear. No more work...but wait! I have things to do in the United States!
Huzzah. : )
A rock...a BB gun...a slingshot
If there's one thing I've learned this summer, it's that you really shouldn't trust the media about what's happening in Israel. Details about an incident are instantly shouted to the world authoritatively without being properly checked.
Driving back from the northern part of Israel Sunday afternoon, our bus' right rear window shattered. That sounds much more dramatic than it was. The window was a two-paner and only the outer bit shattered. No one was hurt, or even really panicked for a while. The bus stopped behind another pulled-over bus. And then all hell broke loose. Things that were told in the next two hours:
1. It was kids throwing rocks.
2. A bunch of the guys went in pursuit of those who committed the crime.
3. People were shooting at the buses with a BB gun.
4. It was a slingshot.
5. The kids were Arabs, definitely Arabs.
6. It was some bored Israelis.
The bus went off to the police station to be photographed and have the window temporarily cared for. We hung out at a store with ice cream and beer (of which I had neither). We arrived safely in Jerusalem an hour and a half later than anticipated.
The real story (at least for now) is that it was merely bored Jewish Israeli boys with a slingshot. Stupid, but not a national or ideological action.
Driving back from the northern part of Israel Sunday afternoon, our bus' right rear window shattered. That sounds much more dramatic than it was. The window was a two-paner and only the outer bit shattered. No one was hurt, or even really panicked for a while. The bus stopped behind another pulled-over bus. And then all hell broke loose. Things that were told in the next two hours:
1. It was kids throwing rocks.
2. A bunch of the guys went in pursuit of those who committed the crime.
3. People were shooting at the buses with a BB gun.
4. It was a slingshot.
5. The kids were Arabs, definitely Arabs.
6. It was some bored Israelis.
The bus went off to the police station to be photographed and have the window temporarily cared for. We hung out at a store with ice cream and beer (of which I had neither). We arrived safely in Jerusalem an hour and a half later than anticipated.
The real story (at least for now) is that it was merely bored Jewish Israeli boys with a slingshot. Stupid, but not a national or ideological action.
Hey everyone!
Life is wonderful! I have stories for you...but I'm frantically finishing a paper, packing, and getting ready to fly back to the United States. I will get a bunch of stories up in the next few days.
Love you all!
Love you all!
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