The Arabs: Buber vs. Jabotinsky

Two prominent thinkers in 1920s Zionism, contrasted over the Arab question in Palestine.

Political scientists studying Israeli opinion of today generally classify political ideology along a spectrum with ends termed “left” and “right.” Leftist ideology today focuses on the need for a Jewish majority: A large population of Jewish people is what makes a Jewish state. For the political right, land is critical: Jewish control of Biblical territory is what makes a Jewish state. As a result, individuals in the political left tend to favor negotiations, are willing to make concessions, and wish to find a peace agreement with the Palestinians (generally in terms of a two-state solution). Those in the right camp tend to favor a more militaristic approach and believe that land concessions critically undermine the Jewish state.
These contrasting political stances are not new to internal Jewish debate. They reflect a disagreement that has always coexisted with Zionism on what actually makes up a Jewish state (put simplistically, land or people). In the pre-state days of Zionism, high-profile leaders debated this in the public scene. The difference of opinion had strong implications for the Zionist stance regarding the Arab population living in Palestine at the time (and still does today). Here, we will explore two Zionist thinkers writing in the 1920s and ‘30s about the “Arab question” in the “Jewish problem.” Ze’ev Jabotinsky is generally associated with the right of the political spectrum; while Martin Buber is classified on the left.
Ze’ev Jabotinsky was born in 1880. He grew up in Eastern Europe and studied in Switzerland and Italy. Heavily influenced by Italian ideas of revolution, Jabotinsky formed a militant youth movement called Betav, named after the place where the famous Bar Kochba died. In Betav, young Jews learned to use lead. The Arab question loomed ahead.
In “An Iron Wall (We and the Arabs),” Jabotinsky laid out his belief that the Jews should militarize and form an “Iron Wall” against which the Arabs could not break. He saw agreements with the Arab population as futile: There was no historical precedent for locals giving up to “intruders.” Conflict was inevitable. Because Jabotinsky saw the greater justice in the confrontation as being with the Jews, he had no moral qualms in being militant. This is not to say that he wished to exterminate the Palestinians; rather, he believed they could all happily live in other lands in the region, in Arab majority areas. Negotiation, for Jabotinsky, sent a message of weakness and willingness to compromise. An effective strategy required demonstrations of steadfastness. If the Arabs hit a Jewish military Iron Wall repeatedly, they would realize that breaking through was not possible and be forced to accept the existence of a Jewish state.
In order to create this Iron Wall, Jabotinsky believed the Jews would need the help of the British. To this end, he gave evidence to the Peel Commission on the need for a Jewish state in the region, asserting that the Jewish want was based on starvation; the Arab, on appetite. Jews needed the land of Israel for themselves or they would die out. “If you don’t liquidate the Diaspora, the Diaspora will liquidate you.” The Arabs would not die without Palestine, thought Jabotinsky, they merely wanted it. Typical of the rightist focus on land, Jabotinsky believed the State of Israel should include both sides of the Jordan River (Palestine and trans-Jordan). He called upon the British and the Jews to militarize into his Iron Wall to answer the Arab question.
On the other end of the spectrum laid Martin Buber, a major twentieth century philosopher who focused on relationships and interaction. In 1925, Buber formed Brit Shalom (“Covenant for Peace”). His answer to the Arab question is presented in “The National Home and National Policy in Palestine.” Unlike Jabotinsky, Buber saw the Arab community in Palestine as a nation. He believed that the Palestinians also had claims and rights to Eretz Yisrael. Because of this, Zionism must not come to Palestine with the goal of dominating the Arabs, but rather to live with them. To have a true and legitimate Jewish home, argued Buber, Zionism must reach consent with the Palestinians, or it lost its moral claim. Following the Biblical ideal of the Jews “being blessed to be a blessing,” Buber though that Judaism should demonstrate that two nationalities are able to live in harmony and be a beacon to the world. He felt this was already happening with the kibbutzim: Ideas formed by the Jews were being given to the world. (Contrarily, Jabotinsky disapproved of the socialist movements in Zionism because he believed the Jews needed to focus exclusively on the creation of a state, ignoring other ideals and goals until the first was reached.)
Buber’s answer to the Arab question was binationalism. Two nations would coexist, sharing political territory and a unit called the state (which he believed should be the Mediterranean to the Jordan, allowing more land to be given to other Arab nationalities, very different than Jabotinsky’s requirements). The Arabs and the Jews would sustain their separate cultures while collaborating in political power, defense, and foreign relations.
Though Buber was for a binational state, he never endorsed limited immigration, showcasing the leftist focus on people rather than land.
Buber did not have a fully-developed program for what a binational state would like look. And he faced troubles in finding a partner on the Arab side. As Jabotinsky pointed out, the locals were not keen on another population coming into their region. Jabotinsky, though he had a more fully-developed plan, failed to attain full British cooperation. The two men represent the two ends of the Zionist political spectrum. As happens so often in politics, the action taken to answer the Arab question fell somewhere in the middle, between the two men’s plans. Israel today has a strong military and has held an Iron Wall with many Arab communities (possibly explaining the eventual peace treaty with Egypt following several military confrontations with Israel as the victor). But in the treaty, Israel negotiated with the country and made land concessions, trying to live with the Egyptians – a much more Buberian ideal.